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FOREWORD

The latter half of 2000 and the first 6 months of 2001 are likely
to represent a seminal time in the evolution of U.S. military
strategy. The combination of a congressionally-mandated
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), a change of presidents, and
shifts in the global security environment will force or allow
American strategists to rethink some of the basic elements of U.S.
strategy and decide if any changes need to be made. It is vital that
the defense transformation process be strategy driven rather
than dictated by budgets or technology alone. In other words, the
first step in assessing the status and the future of American
strategy is to examine the concepts and broad alternatives on
which it is built.
The Strategic Studies Institute has undertaken several
projects to help Army leaders and defense policymakers identify
key strategic issues and alternatives. One is a major conference
organized in collaboration with the Georgetown University
National Security Studies Program in September 2000. The
present study by Steven Metz represents another. In it, Dr. Metz
begins with a survey of the evolution of American defense
strategy since the end of the Cold War. He then describes some
the key issues which will shape the upcoming QDR and assesses a
number of strategic alternatives ranging from the existing
strategy to some new and innovative ones. For each alternative,
he describes the key assumptions and the risks involved. He ends
with a slate of recommendations including a controlled shift away
from the focus on large-scale regional war with “rogue states.”
Decisions made in the next year will affect U.S. security for
decades to come. The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to
offer this study as part of the debate and analysis which will feed
the process of defense transformation.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY

Because of the confluence of the congressionally
mandated Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and a
presidential election, the years 2000 and 2001 are likely to
be important in the evolution of American military strategy.
Basic strategic concepts and alternatives will be debated
and analyzed. The results will shape U.S. strategy for
several decades. This study provides a brief history of the
evolution of American military strategy since the end of the
Cold War, delineates the key issues which are likely to
shape the upcoming QDR process, and assesses a range of
strategic alternatives.
Core Issues. Four broad strategic issues are likely to be
particularly important during the QDR and as the new
president frames his defense policy:
Transformation. Beginning with the National Defense
Panel of 1997, a number of influential thinkers have called
for a full transformation of the American military to seize
the potential of the information technology driven
revolution in military affairs. While the specific trajectory of
transformation is open to debate, the Pentagon and the
military Services have established a number of programs
designed to energize change. But some advocates of
transformation contend that the Department of Defense is
less committed to transformation than it might be. Others
argue that the current security environment does not justify
the cost and risk which transformation would entail.
Force Shaping. During the early 1990s, American
strategists made two crucial force shaping decisions. One
was to use “major regional conflicts” like the Gulf War as a
yardstick. The second was to move from a predominantly
threat-based force shaping methodology to capabilitiesbased ones. For a number of reasons, the current approach
to force shaping may not survive QDR 2001. However
vii

inadequate the two MTW yardstick, it is not clear what
should replace it. In an even broader sense, some defense
analysts are beginning to question the use of capabilities as
a force shaping criterion rather than existing threats. Even
though the Department of Defense is not likely to abandon
the capabilities approach in the near term, it will face
pressure from Congress, the media, and the public to assure
a better match between the capabilities of the U.S. military
and the threats it might face. DOD and the Services are
unlikely to find a sympathetic ear for acquisition and force
development programs based on a hypothetical “near peer
competitor” so long as there are few signs of one emerging.
Strategic Focus. The appropriate focus for the U.S.
military should depend on trends in the global security
environment. The key question is whether major,
state-on-state war will remain common enough and
threatening enough to warrant building a military force
designed primarily to deal with it. There is no agreement on
this among strategic thinkers and defense leaders. Given
this, QDR 2001 is likely to see several major questions
concerning the post-MTW focus of the U.S. military:

•

Should the U.S. military continue to focus on
warfighting or treat warfighting and non-warfighting
functions like peace operations, shaping, and
military-to-military engagement as co-equals?

•

If U.S. national security strategy continues to stress
participation in multinational peace support
operations, should the military seek greater efficiency
and effectiveness by developing specialized units to
focus on these sorts of activities, including long-term
nation building?

•

Can large-scale, cross-border, conventional war be
deterred or defeated by some means other than by
combined arms operations by a U.S. dominated
coalition?
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•

Should the U.S. military give greater emphasis to
nontraditional adversaries or emerging enemies
rather than state militaries?

The Strategy-Budget Mismatch. Today nearly every
analyst agrees that the budget predictions which served as
the basis for the 1997 QDR are unrealistic. But as is always
true with economic and budgetary predictions, various
writers disagree on the extent of the shortfall. In the
broadest sense, there are three solutions. One would be for
Congress to authorize dramatically larger defense budgets,
perhaps linking defense spending to a specific percentage of
gross domestic product. Another is to attempt to close the
gap through greater efficiency. The third approach is to
adjust strategy to budgetary realities by redefining national
interests and scaling back on security commitments. In all
probability, QDR 2001 will not solve the problem and may
not even address it. Eventually, though, budgets, commitments, and force levels must be synchronized.
The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review. A range of
strategic alternatives has been developed and debated
within the defense community as part of the preparation for
QDR 2001. Consensus is emerging that this QDR should be
strategy driven rather than budget driven like QDR 1997.
This places extra importance on the strategic concepts that
will be incorporated into the review process. The strategic
alternatives under scrutiny differ in their assumptions,
focus, and risk. Five alternatives merit serious consideration.
Alternative I: Shape, Prepare, Respond. Because the
United States currently uses the shape/respond/prepare
approach, it forms the baseline for the analysis of all
alternatives. In fact, many of what are being called strategic
alternatives during the QDR preparations are actually
variants of the shape/respond/prepare approach rather
than discrete strategies.
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Variant A: The Respond Approach (Current Strategy).
The current variant of the shape/respond/prepare approach
gives responding priority in terms of money, time, effort,
and talent. Responding, which includes the American
reaction to both MTWs and SSCs, is “first among equals” of
the three functions. The Respond Approach does entail
some strategic risks and costs. For instance, it demands a
large and highly skilled force, and a large defense budget. It
can lead the United States to over-extension and may
discourage partners from adequately developing their own
military capabilities. Engagement can cause partners and
the American public to overestimate the extent of
Washington’s commitment to a nation or a region and also
risk “guilt by association” if a military that has undergone
American training or education, or which had held
combined exercises with the U.S. military commits human
rights violations, undertakes aggression, becomes corrupt,
or intervenes in the political system of its state. Finally,
preparing now for an uncertain future can risk “early lock
in” if predictions about the future prove incorrect.
Variant B: The Transformation Approach. The
“Transformation Approach” is based on the belief that the
United States should accept greater short-term risk by
limiting global engagement, canceling procurement of
current or next-generation weapons systems, selectively
lowering current readiness and operational tempo, cutting
some force structure, and shrinking the defense
infrastructure in order to accelerate the development and
adoption of advanced systems, concepts, and organizations.
If this succeeds, it could solidify American military
preponderance for decades to come, thus helping assure a
more stable global security system and protecting U.S.
national interests.
The Transformation Approach is based on several
assumptions. First, while the United States is unlikely to
face a peer or near-peer competitor for several decades—
hence the “strategic pause”—this approach assumes that
one will eventually emerge or, at least, try to emerge. The
x

Transformation Approach also assumes that the United
States has an accurate roadmap for the current revolution
in military affairs so that any changes made bring strategic
advantages. And, it is based on the assumption that the U.S.
military, in conjunction with coalition partners and allies,
can overcome immediate or short-term challenges with
existing technology and forces.
Ultimately, the Transformation Approach entails
accepting greater short-term risk in expectation of a
long-term payoff. If one assumes that the United States has
an accurate roadmap for transformation, that the current
strategy is economically unsustainable, that a substantial
American military preponderance over any conceivable
opponent should be sustained, that a decline in current U.S.
influence in some regions is acceptable or can be rectified at
a later date, and that the current “strategic pause” will
persist for several decades, the Transformation Approach
makes sense. If any of these assumptions do not hold, the
soundness of the Transformation Approach is questionable.
Variant C: The Shaping Approach. The “Shaping
Approach” grows from the conclusion that MTWs are
increasingly unlikely. This gives the United States a chance
to place greater emphasis on the use of the military for
shaping and engagement to preempt conflict, increase
regional stability, augment the capabilities of American
partners, and deter the “states of concern.” It would also
allow significantly smaller defense budgets since shaping
activities are less costly than warfighting, and since greater
regional stability would allow force reductions.
While a Shaping Approach would help save defense
dollars and potentially augment regional stability in some
parts of the world, it would be a risky venture if predictions
about the demise of large-scale war prove wrong. Moreover,
a Shaping Approach assumes that the recent democratic
reforms and economic growth will continue. Clearly the U.S.
military would not undertake engagement with oppressive,
nondemocratic partners. It is possible that the first decade
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of the 21st century will prove to be the high water mark of
political reform and democratization, with regression
toward authoritarianism or fragmentation taking place as
the political and economic expectations of the citizens of
transitional states are frustrated. A Shaping Approach also
risks guilt by association, creeping commitment, and over
extension.
Variant D: The Warfighting Approach. The
“Warfighting Approach” is based on the belief that shaping,
engagement, and preparing should be secondary functions
for the U.S. military. What distinguishes the Warfighting
Approach from the Respond Approach is the separation of
major war from smaller scale contingencies. The
warfighting approach is based on the belief that the focus of
the American military should be MTWs or, at least,
large-scale war, with SSCs accorded lower priority. Like the
Transformation Approach, the Warfighting Approach
advocates diminishing American engagement in shaping
and SSCs. But, rather than doing this as a means of shifting
resources to transformation efforts, the warfighting
approach advocates diminished engagement strictly on the
basis of strategic prudence: by expending so much time,
effort, and money in regions of the world less important to
the United States, Washington is increasing the risk to U.S.
interests in the core regions.
While the Warfighting Approach to U.S. military
strategy would be a more focused and cheaper one than the
current strategy, it would entail an increase in both
short-term and long-term risk. By abandoning shaping and
engagement activities, conflicts that might have been
deterred or avoided may break out. The U.S. military would
play only a limited role in smaller conflicts in noncore
regions. This would erode the position of leadership
currently held by the United States and could leave the U.S.
military unable to perform functions demanded of it by the
American people and their elected leaders.
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Alternative II: A Counter-Asymmetry Strategy. The idea
behind the counter-asymmetry strategy is that responding
to existing or potential threats should, in fact, remain the
central focus of American military strategy, but the current
strategy prepares for the wrong kind of challenge. The
counter-asymmetry approach to U.S. military strategy
recognizes this and would adjust force structure,
operational concepts, and equipment accordingly. The
question then becomes: what forms of asymmetry will be
most common and, more importantly, most problematic for
the United States?
A counter-asymmetry approach to U.S. military strategy
would de-emphasize forces and capabilities used for
traditional force-on-force combat in open terrain, and focus
instead on counter-terrorism, homeland defense, missile
defense, urban operations, operations without large
in-theater bases, dispersed nonlinear operations, military
robotics, and other activities that might thwart asymmetric
activities. The U.S. military would also need to develop
hybrid hierarchy-network organizations to counter
networked opponents.
The primary risk of a counter-asymmetry approach is
guessing wrong. The United States could undertake great
efforts to prepare for a type of enemy or a type of conflict that
never emerges. This would not only be expensive, but could
also undercut support from the American public and its
elected leaders, and erode morale within the U.S. military.
Ultimately preparing for the wrong kind of asymmetric
threat could be just as dangerous as not preparing at all.
There is also the same risk seen in several other strategic
approaches under consideration, that shifting the focus of
the American military away from MTW might make it more
likely to occur. In all probability, the time is not yet right for
the United States to shift to a counter-asymmetry strategy.
Alternative III: Preventive Defense. All variants of the
shape/respond/prepare strategy reflect the belief that the
United States has three levels of national interest—vital,
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important, and humanitarian—and that U.S. military
power should be used to promote or protect all three so long
as the expected costs and risks are in accordance with the
significance of the interest at stake. It is, in other words, a
military strategy appropriate for a superpower that has the
ability and the will to become involved in many kinds of
issues and in many places. There is a growing movement,
though, that contends that such an unlimited national
security strategy will ultimately prove insolvent. Thus the
United States needs to resist the temptation to use military
force on problems and issues that are ultimately peripheral
or secondary and focus on truly important national
interests. The United States needs, in other words, a
national security strategy of constraint and focus rather
than one of unconstrained enlargement and engagement.
Former Clinton officials William Perry and Ashton
Carter advocate a strategy that focuses on “A” list threats
that might challenge the survival, way of life, and position
in the world of the United States. These include the danger
that Russia might descend into chaos, isolation, and
aggression; the danger that Russia and other Soviet
successor states might lose control of their weapons of mass
destruction; the danger that China could become
increasingly hostile; the danger that weapons of mass
destruction will proliferate and present a direct military
threat to U.S. forces and territory; and the danger that
catastrophic terrorism might occur on U.S. territory. Such
issues do not capture the headlines like humanitarian
disasters but, according to Perry and Carter, will determine
the future security of the United States.
The preventive defense strategy is based on several key
assumptions. The most important is that shaping activities
on the part of the U.S. military can have a positive effect on
developments in China and Russia, and can lower the
danger from terrorism. The preventive defense strategy
also assumes that the threat from rogue states will, at
worst, remain steady and may actually decrease, so a
modest improvement in U.S. forces will preserve an
xiv

adequate military advantage. Finally, preventive defense
assumes that “C” list problems will not expand or escalate
into more serious threats. They can, in other words, be
handled with a very modest effort or even ignored, with no
long-term repercussions. Risks arise if any of these
assumptions prove false.
Alternative IV: Supporting Regional Structures. Current
strategy notes that the U.S. military usually operates with
partners, but in every type of coalition operation except
peacekeeping in peripheral areas, the United States plans
to be the dominant member. A strategy of supporting
regional structures would reverse this so that the normal
state of affairs would be for the U.S. military to be the
supporting coalition partner rather than the supported one.
This could diminish the chances that U.S. actions will
provoke opposition or intimidate other states. It could also
be a more affordable and sustainable strategy than one in
which enemies are always defeated by American-led
coalitions.
A U.S. strategy of supporting regional security
structures would reflect the fact that local states are more
interested in and better able to understand their region’s
security than are Americans. It would also take advantage
of the fact that regional and subregional security organs are
taking form in nearly all parts of the world. At the political
level, such a strategy would help with the formation of
multinational security structures where none exist, and
assist with the development of those that do. During
peacetime, the U.S. military would augment the
effectiveness of regional structures, primarily through
support to regional exercises, combined training, and
professional military education. During crises or conflict,
the United States would provide support to regional
structures according to specific needs. This might be
improved command and control, missile defense,
intelligence support, transportation, medical or other types
of combat support, and combat service support. In some
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instances, the United States might bolster a regional
structure with long-range fire support or even landpower.
To perform this support function, the U.S. military, both
the CINCs and the services, would need some reorganization. The U.S. Army, for instance, would form dedicated
support divisions specifically designed to augment allies in
areas where they are weak. At the same time, the United
States would retain effective combat units for those
instances where regional structures are inadequate or
where conditions dictate unilateral American military
actions. It would also continue a robust process of
experimentation to explore and integrate emerging
capabilities.
A strategy of supporting regional structures entails two
important types of risk. The first is the risk that allied or
partner states may not be able to defeat aggression on their
own. Another risk is that a strategy of supporting regional
structures might lead to a decline in the ability of the United
States to dictate or control the outcome of crises and
conflicts around the world. This is undeniable, but may not
be undesirable.
Alternative V: Strategic Reconfiguration. In this
alternative, the vital tasks of American strategy would
remain the same: responding to MTWs, responding to SSCs,
shaping/engagement, and preparing for the future. All
components of the armed forces and the Department of
Defense would stress preparation, particularly experimentation and concept development. But, responsibility for the
immediate tasks—MTWs, SSC, and shaping/
engagement—would be reassigned. Strategic reconfiguration would entail: (1) refocusing American strategy so
that SSCs are equal to or have a higher priority than MTWs;
and, (2) refocusing U.S. land forces on SSCs.
Strategic reconfiguration is based on several
assumptions: MTWs instigated by cross border aggression
by rogue states is becoming less likely; should it occur, it
could be defeated and reversed by a combination of regional
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forces, standoff American fires, and other methods of
American support; SSCs, shaping, and engagement will be
the primary tasks of the U.S. military; and SSCs, shaping,
and engagement usually are not amenable to standoff
solutions. If all of these assumptions hold, strategic
reconfiguration entails acceptable risk. If any of them do not
hold, strategic reconfiguration could increase the chances
that aggressor states will instigate MTW, make ultimate
defeat of MTWs impossible or more costly, and, as a result,
diminish U.S. influence in those regions where MTWs are
possible.
The Evolution of American Strategy. Three types of
relationships form the building blocks of American national
security strategy: relationships of affinity, necessity or
humanity. Much of strategy can be distilled into decisions
concerning the priority and forms of these relationships.
Even as U.S. strategy approaches the point of great
decisions that will shape the future, the Army tends to think
operationally rather than strategically. To assure its
long-term relevance, the Army needs to place greater
emphasis on strategic level analysis. The confluence of the
2001 QDR, a presidential transition, and the Army’s
transformation process provides an excellent opportunity to
do this. This begins with basic concepts—what should be
done and what could be done.
The Army makes three defining contributions to the
joint team. The first is versatility. The Army covers a larger
part of the spectrum of military tasks than any of the other
Services. The second is ability to attain strategically
decisive results in war. The third is the potential to provide
broad-spectrum support to allies and friends. Given these
characteristics of the Army’s contribution to the joint team,
Army leaders should do two things during the 2001 QDR.
The first is to design force and concept development
programs that augment these defining characteristics—
versatility, full spectrum decisiveness, and broad-spectrum
support. The second is to assure that these defining
characteristics become central components of American
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military strategy. While versatility has moved in this
direction as the array of tasks given the U.S. military
expanded, greater effort is needed to amplify the role of
full-spectrum decisiveness and broad-spectrum support.
The contours of the 21st century security environment,
which were unclear in 1997, are moving into view. There is
not only the opportunity for more substantial strategic
change, but also a growing need for it. Given this, the
soundest military strategy for the United States in coming
years is one that blends components of all five of the
strategic alternatives that have been discussed here. It
should integrate the following characteristics:

•

Increased emphasis on joint, combined, and
inter-agency experimentation, research, and
development, but avoidance of lock-in to one
particular type of future force. Phrased differently,
the U.S. military should prepare for transformation
but not yet undertake it ;

•

Abandonment of the two MTW force shaping yardstick;

•

Greater emphasis on asymmetric and nontraditional
challenges (to include cancellation of procurement
applicable only or primarily to MTWs);

•

Movement toward a national security strategy that
stresses collaboration and partnership rather than
dominance and unilateralism. Development of
concepts and organizations designed specifically to
support regional partners and allies during
peacetime, crisis, and war (including a national
security strategy that concentrates on aiding with the
formation and development of regional structures);

•

A broadened approach to the issue of decisiveness to
include a strategic meaning as well as an operational
one;
xviii

•

A strategic focus on potential peer competitors,
specifically Russia and China. Modest engagement
with these nations while retaining the capability to
shift to containment if they prove unwilling to
cooperate on the construction of global and regional
security systems.
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INTRODUCTION
Stiff and unbending is the principle of death.
Gentle and yielding is the principle of life.
Thus an Army without flexibility never wins a battle.
A tree that is unbending is easily broken.
— Tao Te Ching

The United States is as safe as any nation in recent
memory yet remains obsessed with its security. Just as the
nouveau riche are more aware than “old money” that wealth
can dissipate as easily as it comes, America, as a late
entrant to the cast of great powers, worries that the nation’s
influence will crumble and some yet-unnamed opponent
will steal a march. Psychologically the United States is an
insecure superpower. Rather than savoring predominance,
American defense analysts and political leaders
increasingly contend that the United States is approaching
a point of danger or crisis for its military. Senator Bill Frist
(R-Tenn), for instance, has argued that “the hollow state of
readiness so many have warned about has already
arrived.” 1 Daniel Goure and his colleagues at the influential
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) talk
of an imminent defense “train wreck” that may lead to failed
military operations, an unwillingness on the part of
American political leaders to use the U.S. military, and a
lack of confidence on the part of America’s allies. 2 And
analysts like John Hillen predict a defense “death spiral” if
fundamental strategic changes aren’t forthcoming. 3
Whether the state of American defense is really so dire
can be debated, but tough decisions regarding American
military strategy have been avoided or postponed since the
downfall of the Soviet Union. Throughout the strategic
community, support grows for a serious and far-reaching
reevaluation of U.S. military strategy. The most basic
questions—why, when, and how armed force should be
used—are being asked. While it is very difficult to prevent
1

strategic discourse from devolving into debates about what
expensive new system should or should not be bought, or
whether the military should or should not shrink, such
questions cannot be answered without clarity on strategic
concepts. Thinking about them is thus a process of immense
importance with repercussions not only for Americans, but
for the global security system as a whole.
While debate over American military strategy has
simmered since the end of the Cold War, it is reaching new
levels of intensity. Ironically, this is not the result of an
event in the global security environment—a great success or
startling defeat—but rather the confluence of a
congressionally mandated Quadrennial Defense Review
(QDR) and a presidential election. The coming year may see
a real revision of American military strategy or simply a few
cosmetic alterations. But whether because of what was
decided or what was not decided, the years 2000 and 2001
are likely to be important ones in the evolution of American
military strategy.
This study is designed to support QDR-related analysis
by identifying major issues and strategic concepts. Part I
provides context and background. George Santayana’s
aphorism that “those who do not remember the past are
condemned to repeat it," although a cliche, remains true, so
this study will begin by tracing the documents, studies,
debates, and concepts which shaped the evolution of U.S.
defense strategy during the past decade. (A chronology of
key strategic documents and reports is included in the
appendix.) Part II focuses on issues and alternatives under
consideration as part of the QDR process. It will deal
primarily with strategic concepts rather than with
acquisition or force structure issues. Whether to buy
systems like the Crusader or Joint Strike Fighter are very
important questions but they only can be answered
following debate and consensus on key strategic concepts.
Acquisition and force structure are dependent variables,
not independent ones; to decide what to buy and then decide
what to do with it is not the most effective means of
2

promoting American security. Part III will offer conclusions
and recommendations.
Finally, the analysis throughout this study will be
landpower in orientation. Today the role of American
landpower and its strategic significance is being questioned.
Decisions that are made concerning key strategic concepts
will have immense implications for the size and role of U.S.
land forces. By understanding the concepts and issues that
constitute U.S. military strategy, decisions about the role
and relevance of landpower as well as the setting of
strategic priorities will become easier.

3

PART I: THE EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN
MILITARY STRATEGY
The Base Force.
Containment, of course, was the bedrock strategic
concept during the Cold War. This reflected the defensive
perspective on military force that dominated strategic
American thinking. Except for occasional spasms of
aggression, military power was not used for territorial
expansion outside what Americans considered their
“natural” boundaries. During the Cold War, the primary
task of the U.S. military was to prevent the expansion of
communism by force. The main threats were conventional,
armor-heavy Warsaw Pact forces in Europe, communist
insurgents in other areas, Soviet nuclear forces, the Soviet
Navy, and—ironically—the lingering isolationist tendency
of the American people and their elected leaders. To counter
these, U.S. defense leaders developed an array of
supporting strategic concepts. These included:

•

Formation and sustainment of a web of alliances and
security commitments;

•

Forward deployed, heavy forces to serve as a
guarantee of American commitment to the defense of
allies and to minimize the chance that invaders would
have to be expelled from allied territory;

•

The ability to augment forward deployed forces
through rapid, long-distance reinforcement and the
mobilization of large reserve component forces;

•

Air and naval superiority;

•

Interoperability with allied forces;

•

Extended nuclear deterrence;
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•

Reliance on qualitative superiority in equipment,
technology, training and doctrine to compensate for
quantitative inferiority;

•

Cultivation of clients or proxies in areas of
less-than-vital concern, especially through security
assistance;

•

Counterinsurgency support to friendly regimes
(eventually support to insurgents attempting to
overthrow unfriendly regimes); and

•

Limited use of the active component of the U.S.
military in non-warfighting missions.

These strategic concepts were adapted and revised after
the demise of the Soviet Union. This task fell first on the
defense and national security team of the Bush
administration. The initial reaction was a modest shift, at
least in terms of strategic concepts. Even had the Bush
administration been more inclined to undertake radical
change in military strategy, Iraq’s August 1990 invasion of
Kuwait suggested that many elements of the strategy were
as germane in the post-Cold War world as they previously
were. To change from planning to defeat the Soviet military
to planning the defeat of an enemy trained and equipped by
the Soviets was not difficult. In addition, most of the
equipment, training, and doctrine that had been developed
by the U.S. military during the latter stages of the Cold War
remained relevant.
Still, the Bush administration was not overly quick to
pronounce the Soviet threat dead. The President remained
wary of Moscow’s intentions and capabilities, particularly
its strategic nuclear weapons and the 3 million men
remaining in the Soviet armed forces. 4 But the realization
was growing among key policymakers that, “in the
aftermath of the Cold War, we will likely discover that the
enemy we face is less an expansionistic communism than it
is instability itself.” 5 To deal with this, Bush proposed a
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defense strategy built on four “fundamental demands”:
nuclear deterrence, forward presence, crisis response, and
reconstitution. These ideas were fleshed out when General
Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
published an unclassified National Military Strategy in
1992. The complexity of the security environment was a
pervasive theme of this document. “[T]he old international
order,” it stated, “was familiar, tangible, and it provided a
focal point for Free World policies. Now that focus has been
blurred by a whirlwind of historic change.” 6 The strategic
concepts that would allow the United States to create what
President Bush described as a “new world order,” though,
were identical to earlier ones: readiness, collective security,
arms control, maritime and aerospace superiority, strategic
agility, power projection, technological superiority, and
decisive force. Powell did note that the threats the United
States would face were more regional than global, thus
allowing the United States to exercise restraint in the use of
force. The “new world order,” in other words, was less a
zero-sum system than the old one. In the post-Cold War
world, Powell contended, American forces would be
committed to combat only when vital U.S. interests were at
stake and all non-military solutions had been exhausted. 7
President Bush and his top advisers knew that
convincing Congress and the American people of the need to
sustain a robust military would not be easy. The American
tradition was quick and extensive demobilization at the end
of a war. Administration officials thought this might apply
as much to the Cold War as to the nation’s various hot wars.
The restrictive conditions on the use of force advocated by
the influential General Powell might have added fuel to
demands for demobilization. After all, the National Military
Strategy said that U.S. military forces should only be used
when vital American interests were at stake and other
means had been exhausted. Such situations were rare. To
forestall or counter demands for radical demobilization and
a slashing of the defense budget, General Powell, relying
primarily on the Strategy Division of the Strategic Plans
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and Policy Directorate and the Budget Analysis Division of
the Joint Staff, developed what he called the “base force.” 8
This was what the Pentagon considered the minimum
necessary to do the things that had to be done in the
post-Cold War security environment, including deterring
aggression, providing overseas presence, responding to
regional crises, and, if strategic conditions changed, serving
as a foundation to rebuild a global warfighting capability.
The base force would include the nuclear triad, 18 Army
divisions (12 active, 6 reserve), 12 carrier battlegroups, 3
Marine Expeditionary Forces, and 26 Air Force fighter wing
equivalents (15 active, 11 reserve). 9 To go below this, the
Pentagon held, would create unacceptable risks for the
United States.
By the end of the Bush administration, the National
Security Strategy admitted that the demise of the Soviet
Union—unlike that of Mark Twain—had not been greatly
exaggerated. But administration officials felt that this
made it even more difficult to convince the American public
and its elected leaders of the enduring need for global
engagement. The final National Security Strategy of the
Bush administration stated:
While we no longer face the possibility of a Soviet-led Warsaw
Pact attack on Europe, regional instabilities continue to
threaten our interests and our security. The world remains
unpredictable and over-armed, and nations have not
eliminated the age-old temptation to use force or intimidation
to achieve their ends. The end of the Cold War has coincided
with a virtual explosion of long-dormant ethnic and aggressive
nationalistic tensions around the world, many of which have
degenerated into international crises. Proliferation,
terrorism, and the international drug trade still threaten
stability.10

This shift in the language of American strategy was
subtle but significant. During the Cold War, the perceived
military threat to U.S. interests was direct. The danger was
outright conquest of friendly states. In the post-Cold War
world, the military threats were more indirect. Violence,
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particularly intra-state conflict, could lead to collapse of
friends and thwart efforts at reform. While Iraq’s invasion
of Kuwait demonstrated that cross-border military
aggression was still possible, American defense experts
searched for a strategy that could deal with both direct,
cross-border aggression and indirect, intra-state conflict.
They knew how to deal with the former; the challenge was
finding a way to use the extremely professional and effective
American military to deal with the latter.
President Bush’s National Security Strategy also stated
that, “The most desirable and efficient security strategy is
to address the root causes of instability and to ease tensions
before they result in conflict.” 11 The question was how to do
this. The Bush administration seized on multinational
peacekeeping as a solution. While peacekeeping under the
aegis of the United Nations had existed since the 1950s, its
effectiveness had long been limited by the Cold War
competition between the United States and the Soviet
Union. Most internal wars became proxy conflicts for the
superpowers, paralyzing the United Nations where both
held vetoes in the Security Council. When the Cold War
ended, the United Nations, under the vigorous leadership of
Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, undertook a
massive increase in its peacekeeping commitments. 12 The
Bush administration saw this as a positive trend. In an
address to the United Nations, President Bush stated, “I
welcome the Secretary General’s call for a new agenda to
strengthen the United Nations’ ability to prevent, contain,
and resolve conflicts across the globe.” 13 For the first time in
decades, the interests of the United States and the United
Nations were at least parallel if not identical—an idea
reinforced by the U.N.’s authorization of the U.S.-led efforts
to expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait. To commit the U.S.
military to greater participation in multinational
peacekeeping thus seemed a logical way to address the root
causes of instability and contain conflicts that did emerge.
In 1992 President Bush decided that the obscure African
nation of Somalia was an appropriate testbed for this idea
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and the right place to begin establishing the rules and
patterns which, he hoped, would define the post-Cold War
world order. As he committed U.S. forces to a humanitarian
relief action known as Operation Restore Hope, President
Bush stated:
...I understand the United States alone cannot right the
world’s wrongs. But we also know that some of the crises in the
world cannot be resolved without American involvement; that
American action is often necessary as a catalyst for broader
involvement of the community of nations. Only the United
States has the global reach to place a large security force on
the ground in such distant places quickly and efficiently and
thus save thousands of innocents from death.14

In some ways, the catastrophe in Somalia was an
inevitable by-product of the end of the Cold War. Under its
former dictator Sid Barre, Somalia had actively played the
Cold War game, switching from a Soviet to an American
client as the winds of geostrategy shifted. When Sid Barre
was overthrown in 1991, Somalia, which was always a
precarious and conflict-prone place, collapsed into violent
chaos, becoming what eventually would be known as a
“failed state.” 15 Famine ensued. As horrific pictures of the
Somali humanitarian disaster were broadcast around the
world, demands grew in the United States and elsewhere for
intervention. Despite the absence of anything other than
symbolic U.S. national interests in Somalia, the Bush
administration, facing mounting criticism of its failure to
act, became convinced that it could serve as a model for a
new assertive style of multinational peacekeeping or
peacemaking. 16 In April 1992 the U.N. Security Council
passed a resolution authorizing multinational force to
provide security for the humanitarian organizations
distributing famine relief in Somalia. 17 From 1992 to 1994
the United States participated in the U.N. Operation in
Somalia (UNOSOM) and United Task Force (UNITAF). 18
But while these operations did help protect relief
organizations and save Somali lives, they did little to
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alleviate the root causes of the conflict, particularly the total
absence of effective government or administration.
The message that the Bush administration intended to
send by involvement in Somalia was that the United States
would act in partnership with the United Nations to
engineer stability and prevent humanitarian disasters
wherever they occurred. Instead, Somalia showed the
complexity and cost of rejuvenating “failed states” and the
danger that such efforts could pose to American public
support for global engagement. By the time George Bush
left office in January 1993, the idea of using the U.S.
military to address the root causes of conflict and the notion
that the United Nations would serve as a co-equal partner
were being questioned. The message was clear: the great
victory over Iraq showed that conventional war could be
relatively quick and low-cost, and thus gain the enthusiastic
support of the American people. Intervention in failed
states and other forms of low-intensity conflict could be
difficult, bloody, protracted and confusing. Public support
for it was weak. It thus should be avoided whenever
possible. The U.S. military took these lessons to heart.
The Bottom Up Review.
The beginning of the Clinton administration gave hints
of broad change in American strategy. When the Base Force
was first developed, influential members of Congress like
Senator Sam Nunn (D-Ga) and Congressman Les Aspin
(D-Wisc) were convinced that it was too large, contained the
wrong kinds of capabilities, and was too expensive. 19
President Clinton and his top advisers subscribed to this
idea. The United States, they felt, could remain a global
power with substantially lower levels of defense by working
with partners, allies and the United Nations. 20 The
foundation for Clinton strategy was “engagement and
enlargement.” The stress on “engagement” was intended to
both reassure friends and enemies that the United States
would remain active, and to counter sentiment for
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withdrawal among the American people. “American
leadership in the world,” the Clinton strategy held, “has
never been more important.” 21 “Enlargement”—a concept
advocated most persistently by National Security Advisor
Anthony Lake—committed the United States to expand the
community of market democracies as a means of
augmenting American security and prosperity. This is an
important idea. Since the beginning of U.S. history, debate
has raged between those who favored a passive foreign and
national security policy in which the United States only
protected itself and served as a “beacon” for others, and
those who wanted to use American power to spread
democracy and free market policies. This schism is nearly as
old as the United States, pitting Thomas Jefferson’s credo of
“peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations,
entangling alliances with none” and his ideas of strategic
independence and nonintervention, against the greater
activism associated with presidents like Theodore
Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson. 22
The schism between the limited and activist versions of
American foreign policy erupted again during the early
years of the Cold War. As Washington struggled to adjust to
its new role as leader of the Free World, some policymakers
and analysts advocated a purely defensive strategy which
sought only to contain communism until its inherent
weaknesses caused it to collapse. This perspective grew
from the thinking of George Kennan, the “father” of
containment. 2 3 Other policymakers and analysts,
particularly those who saw greater danger from Soviet
military power than from the ideological appeal of
communism, proposed a more active American strategy in
which the U.S. military blocked Soviet advances while
attempts were made to “roll back” communism. 24 This
debate between the passive and active versions of
containment ebbed and flowed, exploding again during the
1980s and leading to the “Reagan Doctrine” of providing
support to insurgents attempting the overthrow of
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pro-Moscow regimes in places like Nicaragua, Angola, and
Afghanistan.
Bush’s “new world order” and Clinton’s strategy of
“enlargement” represented the ascendance of activism in
American foreign policy. 25 To do this, Clinton realized that
the United States needed “robust and flexible military
forces” able to deal with a wide range of tasks, including the
defeat of enemies like Iraq or North Korea, countering
weapons of mass destruction, contributing to multinational
peace operations, and supporting counterterrorism. 26
Clinton accepted Bush’s insistence that the decision to use
force should be based on American national interests, the
degree of commitment from allies (although the United
States would retain the capability to act unilaterally if
necessary), whether nonmilitary means had been tried, and
whether the American public supported the action. 27 But
what characterized the Clinton strategy until the final
years of the administration was a steady expansion in the
roles and functions of the U.S. military at the same time
that it became smaller and the defense budget shrunk.
To design a military strategy to reflect President
Clinton’s wider national security strategy, Secretary of
Defense Les Aspin instigated what became known as the
“Bottom Up Review” (BUR) immediately upon assuming
leadership of the Pentagon. The name was based on the
belief that the changes in the global security environment
were so profound that American defense needed to be
reconsidered from the “bottom up.” Clearly, Aspin felt a
sense of urgency: the study was instigated in March 1993
and the final report was dated October 1993. The BUR, like
the Bush strategy that preceded it, stressed the complexity
of the new security environment. It identified four main
dangers faced by the United States:

•

Dangers posed by nuclear weapons and other
weapons of mass destruction;
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•

Regional dangers, primarily by the threat of
large-scale aggression by major regional powers with
interests antithetical to those of the United States,
but also from smaller, often internal conflicts based on
ethnic or religious animosities, state-sponsored
terrorism, or subversion of friendly governments;

•

Dangers to democracy and reform in the former Soviet
Union, Eastern Europe, and elsewhere; and

•

Economic dangers to the United States in the absence
of a competitive and growing economy. 28

The new strategy committed the U.S. military to two
sorts of activities: prevention and partnership. Prevention
was the use of the military and other elements of the
Department of Defense to attempt to forestall armed
conflict by promoting democracy, economic growth,
economic reform, human dignity, and the peaceful
resolution of disputes. Partnership linked the U.S. military
to those of other countries, particularly ones undergoing the
transition to democracy. The BUR, however, did not
abandon the stress on major regional war which
undergirded the Base Force. Even the number of such wars
used for planning and force development remained the
same. The BUR stated:
It is prudent for the United States to maintain military power
to be able to win two major regional conflicts that occur nearly
simultaneously. With this capability, we will be confident, and
our allies as well as potential enemies will know, that a single
regional conflict will not leave our interest and allies in other
regions at risk.29

The BUR did define major regional conflicts (MRCs)
more specifically than the Base Force strategy had. 30 Since
the BUR considered Iraq and North Korea the primary
aggressors who might cause an MRC, it used their
geography and military capabilities as a yardstick to
develop planning scenarios. 31 Aggression took the form of
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an armor-heavy, combined arms offensive against the
outnumbered forces of a neighboring state friendly to the
United States with only limited U.S. military forces in the
region before hostilities and the United States serving as
the leader of a coalition. The American response involved
four phases: (1) halt the invasion; (2) build up U.S. combat
power in the theater while reducing the enemy’s; (3)
decisively defeat the enemy; and (4) provide for post-war
stability. To successfully counter an MRC, the U.S. military
would need a force package composed of 4-5 Army divisions,
4-5 Marine Expeditionary Brigades, 10 Air Force fighter
wings, 100 Air Force heavy bombers, 4-5 Navy aircraft
carrier battlegroups, and various special operations forces.
In other words, Desert Storm served as the planning
template for major wars and these major wars, in turn,
formed the centerpiece of U.S. military strategy. The logic
behind this was that such wars would be the most
dangerous kind that the U.S. military would face, and if the
U.S. military prepared for them, it would by default be
prepared to handle other kinds of wars.
Although the BUR laid a strategic foundation for the use
of the U.S. military in peacekeeping and peace enforcement,
it relied on MRCs as the main force shaping yardstick. The
Clinton administration assumed office committed to
greater American involvement in multinational peace
operations, but this position was soon overcome by events.
By the time the BUR was completed, the debacle in Somalia
had undercut American enthusiasm for multinational
peacekeeping. An October 1993 battle in Mogadishu which
led to the deaths of eighteen American soldiers and
hundreds (perhaps thousands) of Somalis was particularly
traumatic for an administration sensitive to public opinion
on foreign and national security policy. 32 Most Americans
saw the ensuing withdrawal of U.N. forces and American
diplomats as failures of U.S. policy.
In response, the Clinton administration undertook a
broad reassessment of its entire approach to peacekeeping
and peace enforcement. This reflected a substantial shift in
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thinking from “assertive multilateralism” under which the
U.S. leads efforts to engineer regional stability to a more
limited and indirect American role. 33 On May 3, 1994,
President Clinton replaced Bush’s NSD 7464 by signing
Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25 which outlined his
new policy on peacekeeping and peace enforcement. 34 This
document stressed that warfighting remained the primary
mission of the American military but, under certain
conditions, multilateral peacekeeping or peace enforcement
under the aegis of the United Nations can serve U.S.
national interests. But the process by which the United
Nations formed and managed peace operations needed
substantial improvement and reform. PDD 25 outlined a
number of these including exercising greater selectivity
when choosing where to intervene, involving regional
organizations where appropriate, reducing costs
(specifically, decreasing the U.S. assessment for U.N.
peacekeeping operations from 31.7% to 25%), expanding the
U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations to include a
Plans Division and an Information and Research Division,
establishing a professional Peace Operations Training
Program, and reforming the process by which the U.N.
manages the financial aspects of peacekeeping operations.
Bowing to pressure from the Pentagon and Congress,
PDD 25 stated that the president would never relinquish
command authority over U.S. forces but would consider
placing U.S. forces under operational control of a competent
U.N. commander for specific U.N. operations authorized by
the Security Council. 35 PDD 25 also stressed that peace
operations should be well-defined and linked to a concrete
political solution. They should provide a finite window of
opportunity for combatants to resolve their differences and
failed societies to begin to reconstitute themselves rather
than imposing peace on belligerents. 36 When considering
whether to support a proposed new U.N. peace operation,
the Clinton administration stated that it would consider
whether involvement advanced U.S. interests, whether
there was an international community of interest for
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dealing with the problem, and whether there was a clear
threat to international peace and security.
The BUR was the most comprehensive attempt to form a
coherent post-Cold War military strategy to that point.
However, it drew immediate criticism from across the
political spectrum. Carl J. Conetta, Co-director of the
Project on Defense Alternatives, testified before the House
Armed Services Committee that the BUR, by failing to set
clear priorities among goals and interests, prescribed an
active force structure that was substantially larger than
needed. Mr. Conetta contended that there were only two
regions outside Western Europe where the interests of the
United States and the needs of its allies might require
large-scale U.S. intervention: the Arabian and Korean
peninsulas. He advocated a strategy that focused on these
regions rather than building the capability to intervene
around the world. Conetta also questioned the need for
retaining high levels of military readiness in the post-Cold
War world. “The BUR,” he stated, “transposes a European
central front logic onto regional contingencies, suggesting
that short delays in deployment or reliance on defensive
operations risk catastrophe.” 37 Analysts from the Heritage
Foundation were equally critical, arguing that the BUR
force would be unaffordable and its capabilities were
overstated. 38 In particular, they attacked the BUR’s
emphasis on nonwarfighting missions for the U.S. military.
Finally, the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment
warned that maintaining the near-term U.S. military
capabilities outlined in the BUR would come at the expense
of long-term development. 39 The contours of the debate on
post-Cold War U.S. security policy were thus clarifying:
whether arguing that the strategy placed too much stress on
large scale war, not enough stress, too much stress on the
near-term, or too much stress on the long-term, almost no
one outside the Pentagon seemed satisfied.
Congress quickly weighed in with its own criticism of the
BUR. Many members considered the proposed strategic
changes too modest, reflecting the Pentagon’s fear that
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altering strategy might lead to further cuts in force
structure and budget. The charge was made that the
Pentagon clung to excess capabilities and redundancies,
largely because it was more concerned with preserving its
size and budget than with adapting to new security threats.
To attempt a remedy for this, Congress used the National
Defense Authorization Act for FY 1994 to establish an
independent Commission on Roles and Missions (CORM).
Chaired by John P. White, Director of Harvard University’s
Kennedy School of Government, the CORM included a
number of prestigious defense experts and senior retired
military officers. 40 But anyone who expected the CORM to
recommend radical change in the roles and missions of the
military Services was disappointed. When the CORM report
was released in May 1995 it offered some suggestions on
improving jointness, but did not provide the sort of objective
blueprint for fundamental restructuring of the American
military that its creators had hoped. 41 Two CORM
recommendations, however, did have an impact: the
suggestion that the Department of Defense undertake a
major quadrennial strategy review, and that the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff develop a vision of future joint
operations.42
Even while the CORM was completing its work, the
Clinton administration continued to refine its basic
strategic concepts. While the Clinton strategy had always
linked U.S. defense strategy to national interests, it was
vague on the priority assigned to various interests. In the
1995 edition of the National Security Strategy, President
Clinton distinguished vital interests (those for which the
United States would be willing to use force unilaterally),
important interests (those for which the United States
would use force in conjunction with partners); and
humanitarian interests (those for which the large scale use
of force was not appropriate). 43 In 1996, Secretary of
Defense William Perry began to describe U.S. military
strategy as one of “prevent, deter, defeat.” While this
language certainly did not reflect any radical transition in
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strategic thinking, it did have serious implications. As
Secretary Perry phrased it, the Clinton strategy placed
“renewed” emphasis on prevention by using the U.S.
military in ways that might limit the chances of future
conflict. 44 Preventive defense was to include four “core
activities”: (1) working with the successor states to the
Soviet Union to reduce the nuclear threat; (2) limiting
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; (3)
encouraging newly independent and newly democratic
states to restructure their defenses; and (4) establishing
cooperative military-to-military ties with states which were
not traditional American allies or coalition partners.
Preventive defense represented the beginning of what
would become known as “shaping” activities for the armed
forces.
But all of the changes that had taken place in U.S.
military strategy during this time did not originate from the
White House, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, or the
Joint Chiefs and Joint Staff. Since the end of the Cold War,
the military Services too had been actively reconsidering
the organizational structure, equipment, and operational
concepts they would need in the 21 st century security
environment. All concluded that the rapid pace of change
demanded that planning and thinking be based on a long
time frame. The Army, for instance, began its futures
program in 1992 with a series of battlelab simulations and
exercises called Louisiana Maneuvers. 45 This quickly grew
into the elaborate “Force XXI” process that used battle
laboratories, warfighting experiments, and advanced
technology demonstrations to generate and test ideas. 46 In
the mid-1990s, Army Chief of Staff General Dennis Reimer
decided that his service needed to look even deeper into the
future. Since the main weapon platforms of the Army such
as the Abrams main battle tank, the Bradley fighting
vehicle, and the Apache attack helicopter were expected to
approach obsolescence around 2015, General Reimer
thought it necessary to craft a rigorous method to decide
whether the Army should seek a new generation of tanks,
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fighting vehicles, and helicopters or pursue “leap ahead”
technology. To do this, he created the Army After Next
Project—a series of wargames, workshops, studies, and
conferences to explore the future strategic environment and
speculate on the sort of technology, force structure, and
operational concepts that the U.S. Army might need. 47
The other Services also developed futures-oriented cells
or organizations. The Chief of Staff of the Air Force
commissioned the Air Force 2025 study to provide new
operational and strategic ideas. Often using teams with a
senior researcher of colonel or lieutenant colonel rank and a
number of majors, Air Force 2025 explored topics such as
information warfare, unmanned aerial combat platforms,
organizations to deal with the gray area between peace and
war, and ways to most efficiently erode an enemy’s unity
and will. 48 In a similar vein, the Marine Corps After Next
(MCAN) Branch of the Marine Corps Warfighting
Laboratory began exploring what it calls a “biological
systems inspiration” for future warfighting intended to
explore the use of technology like biomimetic engineered
materials; small, “bug like” robotics; neural or neuronal
nets capable of complex, adaptive responses; parallel
computers; and, nanotechnology. 49 The Marines also
developed futures programs like Sea Dragon and Urban
Warrior. 50 Not to be left out, the Navy created a Strategic
Studies Group to explore revolutionary naval concepts. 51
By the mid 1990s there was a clear need to synchronize
the various Service visions of future warfighting. One of the
most important steps in this process was the publication of
Joint Vision 2010 by General John Shalikashvili, Chairman
of the Joints Chiefs of Staff. JV 2010—to use the document’s
popular name—was to serve as “the conceptual template for
how America’s Armed Forces will channel the vitality and
innovation of our people and leverage technological
opportunities to achieve new levels of effectiveness in joint
warfighting.” 52 The focus was purely operational: JV 2010
did not analyze the changing political, social, economic, and
normative framework of armed conflict at the end of the 20 th
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century. There were, however, some important implied
beliefs about the use of military force, specifically the
challenges to its political usability and legitimacy that
resulted from the information revolution and global
interconnectedness. 53 According to JV 2010, the solutions to
these challenges were greater speed and precision. A U.S.
military able to defeat any opponent quickly with minimum
collateral damage and American casualties would be
politically usable. To operate on a lethal battlefield where
precision weapons, weapons of mass destruction, and
various types of missiles were common, the U.S. military
would need increased stealth, mobility, dispersion, and
higher operational tempo. Four key technologies—low
observable/masking technologies, “smarter” weapons,
long-range precision capabilities, and information
technology—were central. “Superior technology,” the Joint
Staff contended, “has been a cornerstone of US NMS
[National Military Strategy] since the dawn of the Cold War
and will remain so through the year 2010.” 54
The central concept of JV 2010 was “full spectrum
dominance”—superiority over any opponent in any type of
military operation. While stressing that this was only
possible by retaining the high quality levels of people,
leadership, and training, the focus of JV 2010 was using
information superiority to gain full spectrum dominance via
four operational concepts:

•

Dominant maneuver: the multidimensional
application of information, engagement, and mobility
to position and employ widely dispersed joint air,
land, sea, and space forces.

•

Precision engagement: a system of systems that
enables U.S. forces to locate objectives or targets,
generate the desired effect, assess the level of success,
and reengage.

•

Full-dimensional protection : control of the
battlespace to maintain freedom of action during
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deployment, maneuver and engagement, while
providing multi-layered defenses.

•

Focused logistics: the fusion of information, logistics,
and transportation technologies to provide rapid
crisis response, track and shift assets even while
enroute, and directly deliver tailored logistics
packages and sustainment.

These concepts became the foundation for individual
Service programs as each crafted specific programs and
plans to implement JV 2010. In the broadest sense, though,
JV 2010 represented the codification of the idea that a
revolution in military affairs (RMA) was underway, and
that its essence was information technology. 55
The 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review
and National Defense Panel.
Following one of the CORM recommendations, Congress
directed the Secretary of Defense to conduct a “fundamental
and comprehensive examination of America’s defense
needs” every 4 years, with the first due in 1997. The
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) report was released in
May of that year. According to Secretary of Defense William
Cohen, it was “intended to provide a blueprint for a
strategy-based, balanced and affordable defense program”
by examining threats, strategy, force structure, readiness,
modernization, defense infrastructure and other elements
of the defense program out to the year 2015. 56 In reality, the
1997 QDR became a budget-driven process that offered few
new strategic ideas, but simplify codified the strategy that
existed at the time. It described the strategy of “shaping,
responding, and preparing” in which the U.S. military must
simultaneously shape the security environment through
deterrence and engagement, remain prepared for a full
spectrum of crises from smaller-scale contingencies (SSCs)
to major regional contingencies (MRCs), and take steps to
prepare for an uncertain future. The foremost challenge and
the focus of most effort remained “the threat of coercion and
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large-scale, cross-border aggression against U.S. allies and
friends in key regions by hostile states with significant
military power”—Desert Storm-style attacks from Iraq,
Iran, or North Korea. 57 The QDR did, however, mention a
wide array of additional threats including proliferation of
advanced weapons and technologies, terrorism, the
international drug trade, international organized crime,
uncontrolled immigration, and threats to the U.S.
homeland.
The “fundamental assumptions” of the QDR were that
the United States would remain globally engaged, and that
the United States would maintain military superiority over
any adversary through the 2015 time period. The United
States was “the only power in the world that can organize
effective military responses to larger-scale regional threats”
and “able to conduct large-scale, effective joint military
operations far beyond its borders.” 58 The basic goals of
American defense strategy were:
...fostering an international environment in which critical
regions are stable, at peace, and free from domination by hostile
powers; the global economy and free trade are growing;
democratic norms and respect for human rights are widely
accepted; the spread of nuclear, biological, and chemical and
other potentially destabilizing technologies is minimized; and
the international community is willing and able to prevent and,
if necessary, respond to calamitous events.59

The 1997 QDR also introduced a concept which quickly
became a central part of American strategic thinking:
asymmetry. The report stated:
U.S. dominance in the conventional military arena may
encourage adversaries to use...asymmetric means to attack our
forces and interests overseas and Americans at
home...Strategically, an aggressor may seek to avoid direct
military confrontation with the United States, using instead
means such as terrorism, NBC [nuclear, biological, chemical]
threats, information warfare, or environmental sabotage to
achieve its goals.60
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Asymmetry could also be part of a conventional war as an
enemy used it to deny U.S. forces access to a region, disrupt
American operations, or deter U.S. involvement by
increasing casualties. Dealing with or preparing for
asymmetry thus “must be an important element of U.S.
defense strategy.” 61
The QDR, like the defense studies that preceded it,
emphasized the wide range of demands placed on the U.S.
military. For instance, the U.S. military would often be
involved in SSCs. Since these could range from combat
operations like limited strikes or peace enforcement to more
benign activities like humanitarian assistance and disaster
relief, training and other requirements on U.S. forces were
extensive. In fact, no military in history has been asked to do
more things at a high level of proficiency than the post-Cold
War U.S. military. The QDR also noted that, “the ability to
transition between peacetime operations and warfighting
remains a fundamental requirement for virtually every unit
in the U.S. military.” This represents one dimension of a
broad-based stress on speed that was becoming a defining
characteristic of post-Cold War American military strategy.
The most enduring dilemma for U.S. strategists had become
finding ways to avoid a Vietnam-style loss of public and
congressional support for military engagement or a specific
military operation. Speed was seen as a solution. Since the
public tends to initially support the use of force if the
president deems it necessary—the “rally ‘round the flag”
effect—political opposition was less likely to coalesce or
grow during a short intervention or campaign. Similarly,
strategic, operational, and tactical speed were thought to
minimize U.S. casualties, thus helping preserve public
support. Protracted conflict was invariably disadvantageous to the United States. For this reason, the 1997
QDR, like the strategy documents that preceded it and
those that came later, emphasized the need for a speedy
resolution of crises.
The 1997 QDR retained the two MRC force shaping
yardstick. “If the United States were to forego its ability to
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defeat aggression in more than one theater at a time,” the
QDR report stated, “our standing as a global power, as the
security partner of choice, and as the leader of the
international community would be called into question...A
one-theater war capacity would risk undermining both
deterrence and the credibility of U.S. security commitments
in key regions of the world.” 62 After sometimes-intense
debate over the sequencing of the two MRCs, the QDR
settled on the phrase “nearly simultaneous.” Again this
reflected general continuity in strategic thinking. One of the
dilemmas of any public strategy document is how to
simultaneously address an external audience composed of
friends and potential enemies, and provide cogent guidance
for one’s own planners. At times, there is tension between
these two functions. The 1997 QDR certainly showed this.
While it might have been realistic to modify or even drop the
two “nearly simultaneous” MRC yardstick, DOD feared the
message this might send to external audiences. As a result,
the QDR retained a standard that probably could not be
met.
The 1997 QDR also devoted quite a bit of attention to the
idea of “preparing now for an uncertain future.” By 1997
most of the American defense community agreed that an
historic revolution in military affairs was underway. 63 Led
by people like Andrew Marshall, (director of the Pentagon’s
Office of Net Assessment), Andrew Krepinevich (Center for
Strategic and Budgetary Analysis), and Admiral William
Owens (former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff),
the concept of military revolutions has gone from the fringe
to the foundation U.S. military thinking. This made perfect
sense since the type of military revolution that the Pentagon
had begun to pursue meshed with so many elements of the
American strategic culture including a never-ending quest
for technological solutions to problems, the desire for
continuous improvement, the tendency to use qualitative
superiority to keep human costs low and thus retain
political support for engagement, and the perceived need for
U.S. military preponderance. The QDR, along with JV 2010,
25

codified this version of the RMA in American military
strategy. It described three “alterative paths” to the future.
One was to focus on the near term, minimizing the money
and effort devoted to preparing for the long term. The
second path was to accept greater near-term risk by further
reducing the size of the military, thus freeing money for
exploiting the RMA. The third was to balance current
demands and an uncertain future, combining modest force
reductions with steady technological progress. Of course,
this sort of analysis was “cooked.” The technique of devising
three options, one calling for doing less of what is already
being done, one calling for doing more, and one calling for a
continuation of existing actions is common among
bureaucracies not committed to substantial change. Clearly
no rational decisionmaker would choose anything other
than the “balanced” approach which was defined as what
the Department of Defense was already doing. The QDR,
while it placed slightly more emphasis than the BUR on
smaller scale contingencies and the potential for a future
peer competitor, thus recommended almost no change in
basic strategic concepts.
As with the BUR, the 1997 QDR drew sharp criticism.
Much of this dealt with the ingrained conservatism of the
report, especially the lack of any recommended changes in
service functions or cuts to major acquisition programs. In a
sense this was preordained by the organization and
structure of the QDR. Rather than beginning with an
assessment of an overarching strategy and then deriving
implications from it, the Office of the Secretary of Defense
organized the QDR into seven “panels”—strategy,
modernization, force assessment, readiness, infrastructure,
human resources, and information operations/
intelligence—which worked in tandem. 64 All of the panels
had to make assumptions about the recommended strategy
since they had to complete their work before the strategy
panel itself issued its findings. Logically, they assumed
general continuity. Moreover, because all of the players in
the defense community, particularly the Services,
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recognized the high stakes of the QDR in terms of budgets
and force structure, the outcomes were often “lowest
common denominator” recommendations which could
garner consensus by bypassing or postponing tough
decisions. Analysts have long noted that in absence of a
powerful and clear vision from high-level leaders,
bureaucratic decisionmaking usually devolves into a
process of avoiding dissention by deifying the status quo. 65
This seemed to characterize the 1997 QDR: neither the
President or the Secretary of Defense provided an
alternative strategic vision or a vigorous direction of
change, so the powerful organizations involved in the
process invariably moved toward the sort of consensus that
left everyone’s programs and forces intact.
Conservatism was not the only charge made against the
1997 QDR. Analysts at the Center for Strategic and
Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) contended that the review
leaned toward short-term expediency and did not have a
robust and imaginative approach to the RMA. 66 Carl
Conetta of the Project on Defense Alternatives held that the
QDR made no changes to a military that is “sized,
structured, equipped, and budgeted to deal primarily with
contingencies and threats that grow less substantial
everyday,” particularly large-scale, cross-border invasion
by a “rogue state.” 67 And a number of analysts pointed to a
serious mismatch between projected defense budget levels
and the force called for by the QDR. For FY 2001-2005, for
instance, Goure and Ranney estimate a shortfall of $573
billion, or 29 percent. 68
Despite the criticism, the 1997 QDR provided “steady as
you go” guidance that shaped the subsequent efforts of the
Services and the Department of Defense. To assure that the
military was in accordance with the QDR, General
Shalikashvili published a new National Military Strategy in
1997. Heavy on glossy photos and lists of accomplishments,
this document provided a less clear vision of the ways,
means, and ends of U.S. strategy than its 1992 predecessor.
It did sketch a joint force that must be capable of strategic
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deterrence, decisive operations, special operations, forcible
entry, force protection, countering weapons of mass
destruction, focused logistics, and information operations.
It specified the strategic concepts that had become central to
American military strategy during the 1990s:

•

Strategic agility (defined as “the timely concentration,
employment, and sustainment of U.S. military power
anywhere at our own initiative, at a speed and tempo
that our adversaries cannot match”)

•

Overseas presence to give substance to political
commitments, ensure access to vital regions, promote
joint and combined training, assist with force
projection, and contribute to deterrence

•

Power projection

•

Decisive force (defined as “the commitment of
sufficient military power to overwhelm all armed
resistance in order to establish new military
conditions and achieve political objectives). 69

Expecting that the QDR would be unlikely to produce
any truly new thinking, Congress had also commissioned an
independent, senior-level National Defense Panel (NDP) to
provide another perspective on the long-term issues facing
U.S. defense and national security. 70 Where the QDR
advocated continuity, the main theme of the NDP report
was that the United States should undertake “a broad
transformation of its military and national security
structures, operational concepts and equipment.” The Panel
concluded that:
Our military forces today are organized according to current
threats. But today’s threats are not necessarily the ones we
will see in the future. Unless we are willing to pursue a new
course, we are likely to have forces that are ill-suited to protect
our security twenty years in the future. Our future
adversaries will learn from the past and will likely confront us
in very different ways.71
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The Panel specified a “transformation strategy” aimed
at the quickest possible development and integration of new
technology, military systems, concepts of operation, and
structures. It stressed that the security threats of the future
will be broad ones requiring changed and integrated
alliances, intelligence structures, and interagency
processes. The “two MRC” yardstick, which served as the
foundation of American military strategy, was appropriate
for the present, but might need re-thought in coming years.
In fact, the NDP’s de-emphasis on the two MRC construct
was probably its most significant variance with the QDR. 72
The NDP advocated a number of steps to institutionalize
innovation, experimentation, and change in the military
Services and the Department of Defense, with the emphasis
on jointness rather than independent (and often
disconnected) Service programs. The NDP transformation
strategy also offered ideas on redesigning the Unified
Command Plan to change the allocation of responsibilities,
on transforming the defense industrial base, and
transforming the defense infrastructure. The stress that
the NDP placed on joint experimentation and innovation
was important. The members of the Panel suggested that
the Department of Defense create a Joint Forces Command
which would, in turn, establish a Joint Battle Lab to
undertake experimentation. 73
Despite extolling transformation, the NDP never
clarified the rationale for it. Certainly potential adversaries
will search for ways to circumvent American strength, but
the NDP never made the case that one of these may actually
overtake a U.S. military that continues steady
modernization. The NDP report did not assess specific
enemies, but dealt in generalities. It alluded to dangers but
did not describe them. And, the members of the NDP did not
consider the fact that undertaking an expensive
transformation of the American military when no
challenger was closing in would intimidate neutral nations
and even traditional friends. The NDP, as an independent
organization that did not have to be concerned with
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“breaking rice bowls,” was much more forward-thinking
than the QDR, but ultimately assumed an urgency for
transformation that it could not or did not fully justify.
Ultimately, the NDP reflected the Cold War logic in
American defense thinking where any improvement in
military capability was, by definition, good and desirable,
regardless of political or monetary cost.
Military Strategy Fin-de-Siècle.
In the final years of the 1990s, several new concepts
entered the strategic discourse. In 1998, the National
Security Strategy integrated the “shape, respond, prepare
now” idea from the QDR, first mentioned the effect that
globalization was having on the security environment, and
began considering homeland defense, including
consequence management following a terrorist attack and
critical infrastructure protection, as part of “responding.” 74
All of these things reflected a blurring of the distinction
between the various components of security that had been
underway for several decades. This was seen both in the
realm of missions where the military was increasingly
involved in non-warfighting tasks like counternarcotrafficking, military-to-military engagement,
information warfare, environmental security, and
homeland defense, and in the realm of functions where
there was a broad trend toward privatizing or “outsourcing”
things previously done by the uniformed military. The
questions of how much to expand the function of the
military, how far to push the boundaries of “security,” and
how much to privatize defense functions are likely to remain
contentious for some time.
At the end of the 1990s, senior military and civilian
defense officials also began to stress the concept of
asymmetry. While the word was not used in U.S. military
strategy documents until that time, it quickly become
pervasive. According to Secretary of Defense Cohen, “U.S.
dominance in the conventional military arena is
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encouraging adversaries to seek asymmetric means for
attacking U.S. forces and interests overseas and Americans
at home.” 7 5 This was a recognition that the “peer
competitor” mentioned in American strategy documents
since the end of the Cold War was simply not feasible before
the year 2015. Furthermore, American strategists knew
that future enemies would probably not be as stupid as
Saddam Hussein and challenge the United States in the
sort of open-terrain, combined arms warfare that the
American military had mastered.
The key questions were: What sorts of asymmetric
methods might enemies use? and How could these be
countered? So far, the Department of Defense and the
military Services have focused on a fairly narrow range of
potential asymmetric methods, particularly terrorism,
weapons of mass destruction, information warfare,
environmental sabotage, and actions designed to delay the
deployment of U.S. forces, deny U.S. forces access to critical
facilities, disrupt command, control, communications,
computers, and intelligence (C 4I), deter allies and potential
coalition partners, and weaken American resolve by
inflicting higher than expected casualties. 76 These are
important asymmetric threats, but the list is probably not
complete.
During the late 1990s strategic thinkers also began to
warn that enemies using precision munitions or weapons of
mass destruction to
c o m p l i c a t e . . . The two interlinked conceptsthe
deployment into a RMA and the need for transformationreflect the emphasis on constant
theater of operations change and improvement that is part of
could pose a serious American culture. This has reached new
challenge to some of intensity in the digital age as the time
the most basic tenets between the introduction of new
of American strategy.77 technology, software, techniques, and
ideas and their obsolescence shrinks. . .
As the National
Defense Panel wrote,
“The days of the
six-month build-up and secure, large, rear-area bases are
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almost certainly gone forever. WMD will require us to
increase dramatically the means to project lethal power
from extended ranges.” 78 Some attention within official
circles has been given to enemies who use “complex terrain,”
whether urban environments, jungles, mountains, or
coastal and estuary areas with many islands, inlets, and
swamps. 79 The general conclusion is that the U.S. military
is not yet fully prepared for urban combat or other
operations in complex terrain. 80 There are other potential
types of asymmetry that would find the United States even
less prepared. Examples include political asymmetry in
which an opponent uses information technology and
political actions to hinder or prohibit technologies in which
the United States has an advantage (like information
warfare or robotics); and temporal asymmetry in which an
enemy finds a way to drag a conflict out hoping that
American patience will wear thin.
One of the most far-reaching changes in American
strategy during the late 1990s was growing acceptance of
the need for transformation. Like the idea that a revolution
in military affairs is taking place, the contention that the
U.S. military must undertake transformation sped from
introduction to canon with little debate. The two interlinked
concepts—the RMA and the need for transformation—
reflect the emphasis on constant change and improvement
that is part of American culture. This has reached new
intensity in the digital age as the time between the
introduction of new technology, software, techniques, and
ideas and their obsolescence shrinks. The architects of the
U.S. military have become accustomed to the idea that a
future version of Windows, Powerpoint, or Excel is under
development at the same time that a new version is
introduced, or that a 1 GHz microprocessor will be followed
in a matter of months by a 2 GHz. Extrapolating this logic, it
makes sense to conclude that a future version of the U.S.
military must be under development even while the current
version has unmatched superiority over its opponents.
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Ultimately, this reflects a centuries-long sea change in
the nature of warfare, security, and government. Until the
era of nationalism unleashed by the American and French
revolutions, governance and warfare were about dynastic
struggles. During the era of nationalism, governance and
thus warfare was about politics and ideology. Today,
governance is more and more about economics. This is
changing attitudes toward military forces. In a system of
governance centered on politics and ideology, the objectives
were the creation of balance and consensus. When these
were created, leaders acted to preserve them. When a
military was created that could protect the state, it was
preserved. But in an essentially economic and commercial
system, constant “improvement” or, at least, the
replacement of “last year’s model” with “this year’s model” is
an inherent dynamic. This year’s model must at least look
different than last year’s even if the essence is the same. The
core logic of politics is the exercise of power and the building
of consensus; the core logic of commerce is sustaining
demand by constant change. As the historic era of politics
gives way to an era of commerce, the quest for “next year’s
model” among militaries becomes constant.
As transformation became canonized within the
Department of Defense, each Service undertook the search
for new strategic concepts and organizations. The Air Force,
for instance, now advocates “effects-based warfare.” This is
the ability to permanently or temporarily disable an
enemy’s infrastructure by attacking critical command and
control nodes. 81 The key organization for this is an
Aerospace Expeditionary Force (AEF) which is “comprised
of force modules tailored to meet the specific operational
requirements of joint force commanders across a wide range
of situations.” 82 The Sea Services have begun similar
efforts. More than any other service, the Navy saw its prime
mission—protection of the sea lanes during global war with
the Soviet Union and defeat of the Red Fleet—disappear
with the end of the Cold War. While the Air Force and Army
could shift their attention to Soviet imitators like Iraq and
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North Korea, the Navy could not. None of the “rogue states”
had enough naval power to take seriously. As a result, the
Navy stressed its value in shaping the global security
environment through forward presence operations, in
precision air and missile strikes launched from sea-based
platforms, and at the projection of power to the global
littorals, which are the most heavily populated parts of the
globe.83 The major building blocks were aircraft carrier
battle groups and amphibious ready groups of Marines. The
Marine Corps itself had developed a parallel and
contributing concept called “operational maneuver from the
sea.”84 This was defined as “the extensive use of the sea as a
means of gaining advantage, an avenue for friendly
movement that is simultaneously a barrier to the enemy
and a means of avoiding disadvantageous engagements.” 85
Some of the most creative thinking in the Navy has focused
on “network-centric warfare” in which a postmodern
military using networked sensors, decisionmakers and
shooters collapses an enemy’s will to resist quickly and
efficiently. 8 6 According to Vice Admiral Arthur K.
Cebrowski, President of the Naval War College, networkcentric warfare, “enables a shift from attrition-style warfare
to a much faster and more effective warfighting style
characterized by the new concepts of speed of command and
the ability of a well-informed force to organize and
coordinate complex warfare activities from the bottom
up.”87
While the Army was in the lead in developing formal
futures programs, in some ways it was the slowest to
embrace strategic transformation. Both the Force XXI
process and Army After Next Project projected truly
transformative change for the Army only after 2015. While
committing to “digitization,” the Army continued to stress
heavy, armor based formations engaged in land battles with
other heavy, armor based opponents. But when General
Eric Shinseki became U.S. Army Chief of Staff in 1999 he
recognized that American political leaders were beginning
to question the short- and mid-term strategic relevance of
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the Army, in part because of its focus on the sort of
large-scale, combined-arms, cross-border aggression that
seemed to be becoming less likely as the global security
environment evolved. The problem was not whether an
Army configured for heavy battle could deal with the type
smaller scale contingencies that would invariably occur—it
could with enough time for re-training. The issue was
whether the Army could bring decisive force to bear in time
to deter or contain crises. To deal with this, General
Shinseki directed a transformation to improve the Army’s
strategic responsiveness. 88 In part, this process was to bring
the Army’s structure and organization into congruence with
a concept that the Training and Doctrine Command had
been developing for several years: strategic preclusion
through advanced, full-dimensional operations. 89 This
called for Army participation in a joint force that could
respond rapidly to a crisis in order to contain it or place an
adversary at a decisive disadvantage. 90
General Shinseki’s goal is what he calls “the Objective
Force,” which will be “more responsive, deployable, agile,
versatile, lethal, survivable, and sustainable than the
present force.” 91 Following widespread criticism of the
Army’s slow deployment of Task Force Hawk during
operations against Serbia in 1999, Shinseki recognized that
the Army had resisted the shift from a heavy, slow
organization to a more strategically relevant middleweight
force based on lighter, wheeled combat vehicles. 92 The
Objective Force is intended to address this problem,
allowing the Army to put a combat capable brigade
anywhere in the world in 96 hours, a division within 120
hours, and five divisions in 30 days. As the Army moves
toward the Objective Force, it will retain a Legacy Force
with modernized versions of today’s systems and equipment
while developing an Interim Force that will bridge the gap.
The Army has also begun a search for a Future Combat
System (FCS) to replace heavy tanks and self-propelled
artillery. While no prototype has been developed, the Army
expects the FCS to be a vehicle tailorable for different
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missions including direct fire, indirect fire, air defense,
command and control, troop transport, combat support, and
combat service support. 93 So far, though, the Army
transformation has been driven by deployment speed and
questions of appropriate vehicles. The Army has not yet
developed a full range of strategic or operational concepts to
explain precisely what the Objective Force will do once
deployed.94
Despite the quest for transformation within the
Services, as the Clinton administration approaches its final
months, the foundation of American strategy remains much
as it was in the years immediately after the collapse of the
Soviet Union. Power projection, decisive force, overseas
presence, and strategic agility remain the core concepts.
Just as during the Cold War, American defense strategy
relies on superior technology, equipment, training,
leadership, and people. Admittedly, there has been
refinement during the Clinton administration, particularly
in terms of shifting the military away from a purely
warfighting stance. Although the main “rogues” survived
into the 21 st century, asymmetric threats including those
directed at the American homeland have taken on increased
priority. Thinking about asymmetry has challenged some of
the most basic precepts of U.S. strategic thinking. For
instance, Joint Vision 2020—the successor to Joint Vision
2010—states that, “We will not necessarily sustain a wide
technological advantage over our adversaries in all areas”
given the availability of commercial technology and the
widespread dispersion of new information. 95 The best that
can be hoped for was a “frictional imbalance” over enemies
brought about by information superiority and other
qualitative advantages. Whether this line of thinking is
compatible with the goal of “full spectrum dominance”
remains to be seen. JV 2020 also shows other signs of
maturation in American strategic thought including a
broader, more holistic perspective on strategy and a
sustained discussion of multinational and interagency
operations. Clearly, thinking on U.S. military strategy has
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changed since the end of the Cold War. The question is:
What direction should this take? This is the driving issue
behind the 2001 QDR.
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PART II:
CORE ISSUES

The 2001 QDR could easily turn into a series of debates
about specific acquisition programs or force structure
numbers. Hopefully it will not but will focus instead on core
strategic issues. In particular, four issues should be central
to the debate: the method and speed of transformation, force
shaping methodologies, strategic focus, and the synchronization of defense budgets and the strategy.
Core Issue I: Transformation.
Transformation is an intrinsic element of the American
national character. After all, the United States was born by
transforming the English political and social order into
something new. Constant tinkering and improvement are
natural. Americans change jobs, houses, cars, lifestyles, and
spouses with greater regularity than any people on earth.
Calls for the transformation of the U.S. military, then, find a
receptive audience. Its champions include influential
thinkers like Andrew Krepinevich and William Owens. 96
The U.S. Commission on National Security/21 st Century
(also known as the Hart-Rudman Commission), a senior
level group chartered to review the U.S. security system and
recommend changes, recently joined the cast of transformation advocates as it contended the “mix and effectiveness
of overall American capabilities need to be rethought and
adjusted.” 97
In a sense, the call for radical change in an organization
that is superior to any conceivable challenger is strange.
Transformation advocates use both “push” and “pull”
arguments to justify their position. New technology,
particularly information technology organized into
knowledge systems, is thought to provide an opportunity for
transformative improvement. As a psychological legacy of
39

the Cold War, American military and civilian defense
leaders are loath to let any opportunity slip away. During
the global confrontation with the Soviet Union, there was a
need to seize every strategic and technological opening. This
notion persists so the idea of deliberately eschewing
improvements in the U.S. military—even if doing so would
entail substantial economic and political benefits—causes
deep anxiety. Transformation advocates also contend that
the U.S. military remains configured for Soviet style
enemies using armor-heavy formations to cross
international borders in relatively open terrain and seize
territory to control resources, whether petroleum,
industrial production, water, or something similar. To
defeat asymmetric and nontraditional enemies requires a
very different type of American military. Transformation
advocates also argue that if the United States does not
capitalize on the RMA, some other state will, thus eroding
the political and strategic advantages that accrue from
military superiority. Warnings are made about the
“complacency” of the U.S. military and the tendency to fight
the last war (many of the U.S. military’s futures-oriented
wargames still involve a conventional enemy attempting to
seize the territory of a neighbor with armored formations).
While the specific trajectory of transformation was left
open by documents like the report of the National Defense
Panel and JV 2010, the Pentagon and the military Services
have established a number of programs designed to
energize change. These include seminars, studies, and
wargames designed to explore the RMA by the Pentagon’s
Office of Net Assessment, experiments within the Services,
and the Joint Concept Development and Experimentation
effort of USJFCOM. All of the Services and at least some of
the CINCs have strategies and roadmaps for
transformation. Within the Office of the Secretary of
Defense, the Deputy Secretary chairs special meetings of
the Defense Resource Board to oversee exploitation of the
RMA and implementation of JV 2010/2020, while the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Threat
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Reduction is developing a DOD-wide approach to RMA
implementation 98 But despite the Pentagon’s apparent
acceptance of the need for transformation, actual plans, in
Andrew Krepinevich’s words, “leave the military on the
near side of the coming transformational divide.” 99
According to the Defense Science Board, there is no
DOD-wide strategy for transformation and thus no sense of
urgency for fundamental change. 100 Some members of
Congress and defense analysts point out that nearly all of
the Pentagon’s major acquisition programs are for systems
designed for large conventional battles rather than new
missions and threats including the F-22 air superiority
fighter, the Crusader artillery system, the Navy’s new
attack submarines, and the nine new antiarmor weapons
under development. 101
There are obvious reasons for the less-than-total
commitment to transformation on the part of the American
military. One is the intrinsic conservatism seen in all large,
bureaucratic organizations. It would be extraordinarily
difficult for the senior leaders of the military and the
Department of Defense to totally abandon the
organizations, concepts, and procedures they have spent a
lifetime mastering. And, no element of the Department of
Defense is certain which Service or organization will
eventually gain from transformation. This sparks
hesitance—even outright resistance. But there are other
explanations. Transformation advocates have not fully
made their case. It is hard to conceive of any state catching
up with the United States, much less surpassing it for many
decades. China is the only potentially hostile nation
attempting a serious modernization of its military, and it is
so far behind the United States that it will take a prolonged
period of intense (and visible) effort to even begin to close
the gap in key areas. 102 A more generic version of the
transformation argument does not name a specific
adversary that might overtake the United States but
contends that “globalization” is making advanced
technology available to all and this might, in the words of
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the Defense Science Board, “empower adversaries in a short
time.” 103 This idea merits consideration, but remains only
an assertion.
As a counter to the push for transformation, other
analysts argue that the United States will experience a
“strategic breathing space” with no pressing threats
expected for some time. 104 If some state or non-state actor
should make inroads into the superiority of the U.S.
military, there would be plenty of time to react. Given this,
the cost of transformation is not justified. Hasty
transformation also runs the risk of guessing wrong about
what concepts and technologies will dominate the future
battlefield. Such early “lock in” could leave the U.S. military
with irrelevant capabilities and systems. History suggests
that to transform first is much less important than to
transform correctly. Finally, some experts contend that the
technology to undertake the sort of RMA-based
transformation espoused by Krepinevich, Owens, the
National Defense Panel, the Defense Science Board, and
others is not yet available. Michael O’Hanlon, for instance,
writes that “the technological basis for a radical RMA
transformation of the U.S. armed forces and U.S. security
policy is unsubstantiated.” 105 To transform now before the
technology matures would at best waste a huge amount of
money and, again, lead to early lock in to irrelevant methods
and systems.
In any case, transformation will be a major issue during
QDR 2001 and for the new President and Secretary of
Defense. Transformation advocates will be pitted against
those who feel that the current strategic environment does
not justify its cost and risk. Based on statements made
during the presidential primary campaign, a Bush
administration would be more amenable to transformation
arguments than a Gore administration. Either is likely to
take a serious look at the specific trajectory of change. There
are at least two separate definitions of military
transformation in use today. The technologically-defined
transformation espoused by the National Defense Panel,
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the Defense Science Board, the Air Force, and the Navy is
not the same as the geostrategically-defined transformation
sought by General Shinseki. The former is a drive to
augment operational effectiveness by integration of new
technology; the later is change to make the U.S. Army more
deployable and thus more strategically relevant in a
security environment where strategic speed is considered
vital. Debate also swirls around the extent of
transformation. Should the U.S. military move away from
its traditional weapons systems and operational concepts,
or should it, as General Shinseki proposes, retain a robust
“legacy” capability even while it develops and fields new
style units? While the more conservative approach makes
strategic sense, will the American people and their elected
leaders fund two armies, two navies, two Marine Corps, or
two air forces?
Core Issue II: Force Shaping.
During the early 1990s, American strategists made two
crucial force shaping decisions. One was to use the
MRC/MTW yardstick. As noted earlier, this was not based
on a prediction that Baghdad and Pyongyang or any other
potential aggressors would coordinate their strategies the
way that Germany and Japan did in 1941, but rather to
deter opportunism and provide a blueprint for a worst-case
military force. The second decision was to move from a
predominantly threat-based force shaping methodology to a
capabilities-based one. 106 The complexity and fluidity of the
strategic environment made this necessary. Iraq’s invasion
of Kuwait showed that a state could switch from a de facto
partner—Iraq had been seen as a bulwark against Iranian
aggression—to an enemy in a short period of time.
Moreover, politics dictated the use of a capabilities-based
approach to force planning. While military strategists
might have feared conflict with Russia, China, or even
India, the fact that the United States was attempting to
improve its relations with these states would have made it
difficult to explicitly configure the American armed forces
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against them. These three great powers as well as many
other new or potential friends remained suspicious of
American military power and easily intimidated. As a
result, force shaping was based on concepts like the ability
to win a generic MTW or defeat a generic “major regional
competitor” or “near peer competitor.”
For a number of reasons, the current approach to force
shaping may not survive QDR 2001. As the world changes,
the number of potential adversaries who might undertake
aggression using cross-border, combined arms invasion
appears to be diminishing. Recent events in Korea suggest
that tension there might lessen. 107 Iran shows little
inclination to invade anyone except, perhaps, Iraq. It is hard
to imagine the United States rushing to Baghdad’s defense.
A decade of sanctions against Iraq and extensive
modernization of armed forces of the Gulf Cooperation
Council states diminish the chance that there will be a
reprise of Desert Storm. The Russian military, which was
seen as a potential opponent in a major war during the early
1990s, is hard pressed to dodge defeat at the hands of
Chechen armed thugs. It would take years to resuscitate the
capability for sustained power projection, and Moscow gives
no sign now of wanting to do so. And while China poses a
threat to Taiwan, should Beijing ever invade and the United
States come to Taipei’s defense, the generic MTW force
package would not be appropriate. The American
contribution would more likely be built on airpower, naval
power, and missile defense.
A number of senior defense leaders and analysts have
pointed out that the United States could not undertake two
nearly-simultaneous MTWs today, so retaining this concept
makes little sense. This idea is not new. Soon after the
Bottom Up Review, Representative Ike Skelton (D-Mo) said
that “simple third-grade arithmetic” showed that the
proposed force could not handle two major conflicts. 108 More
recently General Michael Ryan, Air Force Chief of Staff, has
said that his service will never have enough strategic lift to
support two simultaneous MTWs despite ongoing
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modernization efforts. 109 The United States, according to
General Ryan, has “a one-major theater war airlift force.”
There are shortages of other low density/high demand
assets as well, including U-2 RIVET Joint, E-AWACS, E-8
JSTARS, EA-6B, tactical unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs),
aerial refueling aircraft, and Special Forces, particularly
psychological operations and civil affairs units. 110 Daniel
Goure of CSIS has written, “Those in key DoD leadership
positions have known for years that they could not support
the strategy of fighting two near-simultaneous MTWs. They
kept silent principally out of a fear that to admit the truth
would leave the services open to a new round of force
reductions.” 111
Many strategists recognized from the beginning that the
“two nearly-simultaneous” MTW idea was an impossible
goal. During the Bottom Up Review, for instance, Secretary
of Defense Aspin advocated what was called a
“win-hold-win” approach where the United States, in
conjunction with allies, would hold off the second aggressor
until the first was defeated and military forces had been
shifted. 112 Fierce opposition led Aspin to drop the idea but
variants of the “win-hold-win” construct periodically
reemerge. In 1997, for instance, Senator Charles Robb
(D-VA) suggested that the forces used to defeat a second
MTW should come primarily from the reserve component,
units of which would be mobilized at the beginning of the
first MTW. 113 Even if one rejects the idea that a Desert
Storm-type invasion could be thwarted solely with stand-off
precision strikes rather than by a combined-arms U.S. force,
the strategic environment has changed to the point that it
no longer makes sense to use this sort of threat as the major
building block of American military strategy. The
Hart-Rudman Commission contends that the two MTW
yardstick is, in effect, distracting American strategists from
problems that should be addressed. Rather than producing
military capabilities for increasingly unlikely MTWs, the
Commission advocates greater emphasis on expeditionary
and stability operations. 114
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But however inadequate the two MTW yardstick, it is
not clear what should replace it. Whatever its shortcomings,
the concept was clear and coherent. By contrast the concept
of smaller scale contingencies—which are sometimes
proposed as the core force shaping concept—is much
broader and more amorphous. It is impossible to list a
“basic” SSC force package the way that the BUR was able to
do with a MRC/MTW. Put simply, another seismic shift in
the strategic environment is underway: Desert Storm type
invasions are fading, but it is not clear what will replace
them as the centerpiece of U.S. military strategy. Given
this, the Pentagon may cling to something like the MTW
concept (whether one, two, or one plus) until a better
yardstick comes along. This will generate charges that the
U.S. military is “preparing for the last war,” but no one
really knows what the “next war” will be.
In an even broader sense, some defense analysts are
beginning to question the use of capabilities as a force
shaping criterion rather than existing threats. For instance,
the Hart-Rudman Commission recommended that force
structure decisions be made “on the basis of real-world
intelligence assessments rather than illustrative
scenarios.” 1 1 5 While defense strategists defend the
capabilities approach as a logical response to the complexity
of the global security environment, the quickness with
which friends can become enemies, and the rapidity with
which new challenges emerge, critics contend that it is
simply a way to justify a larger military than is really
warranted. Even though the Department of Defense is not
likely to abandon the capabilities approach in the near
term, it will face pressure from Congress, the media, and the
public to assure a better match between the capabilities of
the U.S. military and the threats it might face. DOD and the
Services are unlikely to find a sympathetic ear for
acquisition and force development programs based on a
hypothetical “near peer competitor” so long as there are few
signs of one emerging.
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Core Issue III: Strategic Focus.
Prior to World War I, the U.S. military generally focused
on activities other than large-scale war. The Army was a
frontier constabulary force, played a major role in
infrastructure development, and provided assistance to
civil authorities during domestic unrest. The Marines kept
order on naval vessels and later became an expeditionary
force in what today would be called SSCs. The Navy
protected the sea lines of communication, and chased
pirates and smugglers. During the rare times that the
United States did become involved in major war, the U.S.
military mobilized the forces necessary to deal with the
problem, won the war, demobilized, and returned to its
emphasis on operations other than war. It was only with
involvement in the two world wars and America’s
emergence as a major global power that the armed forces
shifted their peacetime focus to large-scale, conventional
warfighting. But, in a sense, the transition was too
successful. When the United States became mired in
Vietnam, military and DOD leaders initially treated the
conflict there like another conventional war rather than
adapting organization, doctrine, and operational
methods. 116 The argument made by Army generals and
others in the 1950s that a military able to fight a major war
could handle any and all “lesser conflicts” proved wrong.
Eventually, the U.S. military did develop effective
counterinsurgency capabilities, but these came too late to
alter the course of events in Southeast Asia. 117 Following
Vietnam, the U.S. military focused on large-scale,
conventional war. The Army “rediscovered” the operational
level of war, undertook serious study of the World War II
German military’s success at it and the 1973 Arab-Israeli
War, and developed a doctrinal framework—AirLand
Battle—which reflected the central place of large-scale
combined operations in the American way of war. The
military’s leaders were convinced that involvement in lowintensity conflict or operations other than war would erode
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public support for the military, have a deleterious effect on
morale, and detract from the ability to defeat Soviet and
Warsaw Pact forces should war ever come to Europe.
Despite calls in the 1980s for greater attention to lowintensity conflict, including counterinsurgency,
counterterrorism, and new activities like counternarcotrafficking, the military resisted as much as possible.
The U.S. military did develop organizations and doctrine
for low-intensity conflict during the 1980s, but always
accorded these secondary status. A “fast track” career was
one that dealt with large scale warfighting. To concentrate
on anything else was a liability for an ambitious officer with
aspirations of flag rank. The goal of the Services and DOD
was to focus on conventional warfighting while building
enough low-intensity conflict capability to satisfy the
political leaders pushing for greater effort at the lower end
of the spectrum of conflict. 118 A similar dynamic emerged
again in the 1990s as the Bush and Clinton administrations
committed the United States to an increasing number of
multinational peacekeeping operations, shaping activities,
and other types of SSCs but, again, the military treated
these as secondary tasks. Still, the success which American
forces had in the Balkans showed that units configured and
trained for large-scale conventional war could succeed in
peacekeeping if given moderate amounts of retraining.
General Henry Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, has written, “history clearly shows that the most
effective peacekeeping forces are those highly trained in
their warfighting skills and also prepared to conduct peace
operations.” 119 But while this might be an effective way to
use the U.S. military, few would argue that it is the most
efficient. In fact, an argument can be made that the use of
forces trained for high intensity conflict in peacekeeping
was possible precisely because of the declining likelihood of
MTW. And by the end of the 1990s the extensive use of the
American military in SSCs, particularly protracted peace
support operations like Bosnia, created serious problems in
terms of readiness for warfighting and the retention of
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military personnel who were often deployed overseas. 120
The question of whether the U.S. military should be
predominantly organized, equipped, and trained to fight
large-scale, cross-border, conventional war is thus a
persistent one that will be asked again as part of QDR 2001.
The appropriate focus for the U.S. military should
depend on trends in the global security environment. The
key question is whether major, state-on-state war will
remain common enough and threatening enough to warrant
building a military force designed primarily to deal with it.
There is no agreement on this. Many analysts contend that
such conflicts will become increasingly unlikely in the 21 st
century. Michael Mandelbaum, for instance, argues that
major war where the most powerful members of the
international system draw on all of their resources and use
every weapon at their command over a period of years,
leading to an outcome with revolutionary geopolitical
consequences, is obsolete. 121 Israeli military historian
Martin Van Creveld expands the point from war among the
great powers to war among the growing number of regional
powers able to acquire nuclear weapons. Proliferation, he
holds, will obviate traditional state-on-state war. 122 This
argument can be taken even further: the increasing
economic, political, and informational interconnectedness
of the modern world is likely to make costs of old-fashioned
war to seize territory or resources far outweigh any expected
benefits. Admittedly, there may be a few states for which a
particular piece of territory has such deep emotional value
that they are willing to pay the price to gain it but, in most
cases, aggression is as likely to be indirect, incremental, via
proxies, and below the threshold which would provoke a
U.S.-led armed response rather than through traditional
armed invasion.
But despite signs that the likelihood of cross-border
invasion designed to seize territory or resources is declining,
U.S. military strategy—and the forces, doctrine,
equipment, and operational concepts to implement
it—remains focused on conventional war. This is not simply
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due to inertia or a lack of thinking: American strategists
point out that one of the things making large-scale,
cross-border, conventional war less probable is the
demonstrated ability of the U.S. military to counter it. If the
United States allows this capability to atrophy, large-scale
cross-border invasion will again become a preferred
technique of aggression. Focus on conventional war, from
this perspective, is an insurance policy. Even so, the
American people and their elected leaders may not continue
to pay the premium for this policy if there is an extended
period of time without a major cross-border invasion.
Americans are impatient people with narrow historic
perspective. As the perceived threat from conventional war
declines, nontraditional threats will be accorded greater
priority.
The focus on conventional war may survive QDR 2001
but, unless a major war occurs, will come under close
scrutiny in QDR 2005. The speed of this shift depends on
whether: (1) the tottering “rogue” regimes in Pyongyang,
Baghdad, and Tehran moderate their behavior or collapse;
(2) U.S.-China relations deteriorate or improve; (3) Russia
reverts to some form of authoritarianism and external
aggression; (4) the U.S. President elected in 2000 remains
committed to multinational peacekeeping and military
involvement in shaping the global security environment;
and, (5) nontraditional enemies develop the capabilities to
seriously threaten important or vital U.S. national
interests. Desert Storm type wars—meaning large-scale,
conventional conflict undertaken by a coalition in which the
United States provides the bulk of the forces because others
are unwilling and the threat to U.S. national interests is
high—are unlikely. But Desert Storm remains the template
for an MTW. Given this, QDR 2001 is likely to see several
major questions concerning the post-MTW focus of the U.S.
military:

•

Should the U.S. military continue to focus on
warfighting or treat warfighting and non-warfighting
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functions like peace operations, shaping, and
military-to-military engagement as co-equals?

•

If U.S. national security strategy continues to stress
participation in multinational peace support
operations, should the military seek greater efficiency
and effectiveness by developing specialized units to
focus on these sorts of activities, including long-term
nation building?

•

Can large-scale, cross-border, conventional war be
deterred or defeated by some means other than by
combined arms operations by a U.S. dominated
coalition?

•

Should the U.S. military give greater emphasis to
nontraditional adversaries or emerging enemies
rather than state militaries?

Core Issue IV: Strategy-Budget Mismatch.
Many of the major reviews of post-Cold War U.S.
military strategy, including the Bottom-Up Review and the
1997 Quadrennial Defense Review, were essentially
attempts to develop strategies and force structures that
would allow lower defense budgets. Unfortunately,
synchronization between strategy and budget proved
elusive. Today nearly every analyst agrees that the budget
predictions which served as the basis for the 1997 QDR are
unrealistic. According to General Henry Shelton, current
defense budgets are adequate to meet the military’s most
critical requirements, but not to meet all of its identified
requirements. 123 But as is always true with economic and
budgetary predictions, various writers disagree on the
extent of the shortfall. Goure and Ranney are among the
most pessimistic as they anticipate budget shortfalls of
$100 billion per year to fund the 1997 QDR force. 124
Analysts at CSBA predict an annual shortfall of $26
billion.125 Although substantially less than the CSIS figure,
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this is still potentially catastrophic. The Congressional
Budget Office notes that while President Clinton’s FY 2000
budget proposals would increase weapons procurement
from $49 billion in 1999 to $75 billion by 2005, this is still far
below the $90 billion per year needed to sustain today’s
military force. 126 The Army’s proposed transformation
alone is estimated to cost about $70 billion between 2000
and 2014. 127 The only possible source of such money would
be a redistribution of part of the defense budget from one of
the other services to the Army, or a hefty increase in the top
line.128 Whatever figures and predictions for economic
growth and inflation one accepts, there is a substantial
strategy/budget mismatch that is likely to worsen in coming
decades.
In the broadest sense, there are three solutions. One
would be for Congress to authorize dramatically larger
defense budgets, perhaps linking defense spending to a
specific percentage of gross domestic product. This is
unlikely in the absence of some radical degradation of the
global security environment. Another approach is to
attempt to close the gap through greater efficiency. This is
DOD’s preferred approach. Using the blueprint outlined in
the November 1997 Defense Reform Initiative Report, the
Pentagon has attempted to adopt better business processes,
commercial alternatives, consolidation of redundant
functions, and organizational streamlining. 129 While these
are useful reforms, they alone are unlikely to solve the
strategy/budget mismatch particularly so long as additional
base closings and radical shifts in service roles and missions
face insurmountable political opposition. The third
approach is to adjust strategy to budgetary realities by
redefining national interests and scaling back on security
commitments.
Because none of the solutions to the strategy/budget
mismatch—or even a politically palatable combination of
them—is easy, the tendency on the part of the Department
of Defense, the Services, the Administration, and Congress
has been to delay the day of reckoning. Procurement,
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replacement, and maintenance programs have been
stretched out. Some acquisitions have been cancelled. Fixes
to the most pressing and immediate problems have been
adopted without dealing with the long-term structural
elements of the mismatch. The alternatives are higher
taxes, abandoning commitments, or accepting greater
strategic risk to the U.S. military as it economizes on
maintenance and procurement. Because of the large
number of variables involved—the health of the U.S.
economy, the nature of the global security environment, and
so forth—no one can predict exactly when the point of
decision will be reached. It could be months or it could be
decades. In all probability, QDR 2001 will not solve the
problem and may not even address it. Eventually, though,
budgets, commitments, and force levels must be
synchronized.
The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review.
The 2001 QDR comes at a crucial time in the evolution of
American military strategy, in large part because it is
coterminous with the end of the Clinton administration.
This opens the door for a substantial, perhaps even
fundamental shift in some key elements of the strategy.
George W. Bush has indicated that as president he would
order a comprehensive military review to develop a new
architecture for American defense; skip a generation of
weapons; encourage a spirit of innovation and
experimentation within the military; earmark at least 20
percent of the procurement budget for “leap ahead” military
technology; and increase defense R&D spending by at least
$20 billion from FY 2002 to FY 2006. 130 While Al Gore would
be likely to retain more of the Clinton approach, he could
make major changes as well. QDR 2001 will not determine
the military strategy adopted by the new president, but is
likely to affect it.
A range of strategic alternatives has been developed and
debated within the defense community as part of the
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preparation for QDR 2001. The strategic alternatives under
scrutiny differ in their assumptions, focus, and risk. The
issue of risk is a particularly important one. The extent to
which this was assessed in QDR 1997 did not satisfy
Congress, so steps have been taken to assure that the Joint
Staff does a rigorous risk assessment as part of QDR 2001.
This requires greater refinement of the basic definition of
strategic risk and a methodology for analyzing it.
In the broadest sense, strategic risk can be defined as the
probability that an action or failure to act will have specific
disadvantageous effects. These effects can be tactical,
operational, or political. A partial list would include:

•

Higher than expected casualties during an operation

•

Mission failure

•

Higher than expected loss of equipment

•

An increase in enemy resolve

•

An asymmetric response by an opponent (terrorism,
WMD, etc.)

•

Alienation of friends and neutrals

•

A loss of prestige or influence

•

Loss of the “moral high ground”

•

Overextension leading to a decline in the ability to
protect and promote some interests

•

A loss of other opportunities, options and capabilities

•

Higher than expected economic costs

•

Erosion of morale

•

Future difficulties in recruiting
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•

Loss of domestic political support

•

Creation of a new security commitment which makes
demands on resources

•

Encouragement of aggression.

Risk assessment is an inherent part of strategic
planning, but is both an art and a science. It is an art
because it deals with probabilities, and because the concept
of acceptable risk, which is subjective and psychological,
plays such a central role. Acceptable risk varies from
individual to individual, from regime to regime, and from
culture to culture. Some are inherently risk adverse, others
risk tolerant or even risk prone. Acceptable risk also varies
across time: if an individual, regime, or nation sees trends
turning against it or expects greater danger or weakness in
the future, it will become more risk tolerant. Risk
management entails balancing one sort of risk against the
other, accurately assessing the degree of risk that is
acceptable, and lowering the probability of adverse
consequences given the cost of doing so, the interests at
stake, the likelihood of success, and the chance that
decreasing one sort of risk will increase another.
Some of the strategic alternatives tabled in the QDR
process have little chance of adoption in part because they
entail unacceptable risk. The most important example of
this is American disengagement from global security
commitments. This approach does reflect the American
strategic tradition. The historic norm for the United States
is global economic engagement but relatively limited
military engagement, with this limited to geographically
contiguous areas like the Caribbean and Central America.
There is at least some support for a return to this tradition.
Perennial presidential candidate, pundit, and political
entrepreneur Patrick Buchanan, for instance, contends
that the United States is “stretched to the limit” and should
eschew most military interventions. 1 3 1 His recommendation is that the United States return to being a
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“republic” rather than an “empire.” 132 While Buchanan has
no chance of attaining the presidency, his positions reflect
the feelings of a significant number of Americans (even
though not a majority). And, Buchanan is not the only critic
of America’s global engagement. Organizations like the
Cato Institution have long advocated more rigid criteria for
military engagement. 133 Unlike earlier times when
conservative Republicans pushed for global engagement
(primarily to contain communism) and liberal Democrats
favored a diminished American role in global security—as
when George McGovern ran for president in 1972 with the
slogan “come home, America”—current support for
disengagement comes from both ends of the political
spectrum. Ultimately, though, the strategy recommended
by QDR 2001 will call for some degree of global engagement.
The questions are what form of engagement and how much?
Within this context, five strategic alternatives merit serious
consideration.
Alternative I: Shape, Respond, Prepare.
Rich people are not forced to make the same sorts of
compromises and accept the same risks as the poor. The rich
do not have to choose between buying medicine or food, or
take the chance that postponing expensive automobile
maintenance will leave them stranded somewhere. The
same principle holds for military strategy. Those rich in
power and wealth may face problems, but they can avoid
many of the compromises and risks that enmesh the weak.
The shape, respond, and prepare approach to strategy
adopted by the Clinton administration is appropriate for a
state rich in power resources. Many nations would like to do
these three things simultaneously but only the most
powerful can.
Because the United States currently uses the
shape/respond/prepare approach, it forms the baseline for
the analysis of all alternatives. In fact, many of what are
being called strategic alternatives during the QDR
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preparations are actually variants of the shape/respond/
prepare approach rather than discrete strategies. For this
reason, it makes sense to consider them as a group. For
starters, all variants share some common strategic
assumptions:

•

•

•

The world will remain a “loose” unipolar system with
only the United States capable of leadership in all
regions.

°

There is a modest chance of the rise of another
superpower, but this will not occur for several
decades.

°

Regional partners will continue to welcome,
accept, or tolerate substantial American
involvement in regional security.

°

Because most instability and conflict will occur
outside of North America, the U.S. military must
retain a substantial power projection capability.

The military element of power will remain a central
part of American strategy.

°

The United States has vital, important, and
humanitarian interests.

°

Military force will always be used to protect or
promote vital interests, will often be used to
protect or promote important interests when they
are threatened, and may be used in pursuit of
humanitarian interests.

Global engagement and leadership on the part of the
United States is sustainable and should be sustained.

°

The American economy will remain strong.
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•

•

•

°

The American public and its elected leaders will
continue to support U.S. leadership and global
engagement.

°

U.S. defense budgets will be adequate to sustain
existing power projection capability and to
undertake the process of experimentation and
research necessary to prepare for future
challenges.

The global security environment will remain complex
and fluid.

°

There will be a wide variety of threats, both
traditional state-centric ones and non-traditional
ones.

°

Regional grouping will shift with at least moderate
frequency (but key relationships between the
United States and other free-market democracies
or traditional partners will remain strong).

The global security system will see continued
economic and political progress, with occasional
setbacks.

°

The degree of American engagement and
leadership will affect the extent to which economic
and political progress outweighs negative
tendencies.

°

The earlier a conflict is addressed, the lower the
cost and risk of resolving or containing it. A modest
effort now will lower the chances that a major
effort will be required later. 134

The current period is one of rapid and significant
change in the nature of armed conflict.
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°

Those who do not participate in this will suffer
adverse strategic consequences.

Within the parameters set by these assumptions,
“shaping” is the use of the Department of Defense and the
U.S. military in non-warfighting functions to help
strengthen regional defense systems and encourage
partners to undertake reforms that will augment stability
and security. Shaping can take a number of forms such as
arms control, security assistance, involvement in
peacekeeping operations, the stationing of military forces
abroad, participating in combined exercises, providing
training, and other military-to-military interactions such as
staff talks, flag officer visits, and international military
education and training (IMET). IMET is particularly
important for the militaries and defense establishments of
states undergoing the transition to democracy.
Traditionally IMET has brought foreign students to a wide
range of American military schools from those teaching
basic skills to those providing upper level professional
military education such as staff and war colleges. More
recently, the Department of Defense has taken a “forward
deployment” approach to professional military education
and established several regionally-focused senior level
schools specifically for international students (including
both military students and civilian defense personnel).
These include the George C. Marshall Center for Security
Studies in Garmisch, Germany; the Asia-Pacific Center for
Security Studies in Honolulu; the Center for Hemispheric
Defense Studies in Washington, DC; and the African Center
for Strategic Studies which is headquartered in the
Washington area but operates seminars and academic
sessions in various African locations. 135 These schools all
stress the cultivation of healthy civil-military relations,
sound defense budgeting practices, and rational methods of
strategy formulation (among other topics). They are widely
seen as bringing a high return for the money spent. In all
cases, shaping demands close cooperation between the
Department of Defense and diplomatic efforts. It is also the
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strategic function that is the newest from an historic
perspective and the most “nontraditional” in the sense that
it does not entail actual warfighting (although warfighting
skills are often essential).
“Responding” occurs when shaping fails and crises or
conflicts take place. The use of the word “respond” implies
that the United States will not, in all or most cases, be the
first to resort to force, but will react to adversaries who do.
While not made explicit in U.S. strategy documents, recent
practice suggests that the most common objective in
responding will be to restore the status quo ante bellum.
This represents a change from the “American way of war”
that dominated strategic thinking from the Civil War
through World War II and reflects altered attitudes toward
the use of force both in the United States and around the
world driven by the danger of escalation that arises from
global interconnectedness and the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction. 136 Whether correct or not, the
assumption made by U.S. political and military leaders is
that the American people see few if any threats today that
would justify the human and monetary costs of truly
decisive victory, but are content with simply reversing
aggression. As a result, American military strategy seeks
methods of warfighting that are as quick and bloodless as
possible, whether in SSCs or MTWs.
“Preparing” means taking steps today to forestall or
respond to future challenges. Like the other elements of
current U.S. defense strategy, this is not new. During the
Cold War the United States expended tremendous effort
and money on developing next-generation weapons systems
and other forms of technology. Today, though, the time
horizon of the U.S. military is more extensive. During the
Cold War, the pace of technological and strategic change
was slow enough that the Department of Defense could
focus on the “next” system or type of technology. Change has
escalated to the point that the U.S. military must think in
terms of the system or organization “after next” at the same
time that they are fielding the current force or system, and
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preparing to field the “next” force, system, or type of
technology. 137 Because it is not clear what threats the U.S.
military may confront in a decade or two, preparing is at
least partially a guessing process. Potential future
adversaries include everything from a resuscitated Russia
to some sort of networked, non-state enemy. In general,
though, the Department of Defense and all the services have
concentrated on what might be called “applique” techniques
and technologies designed to improve the performance of
the U.S. military at existing tasks rather than truly
transformative technologies like biotechnology or
autonomous fighting systems.
Variant A: The Respond Approach (Current Strategy).
The current variant of the shape/respond/prepare approach
gives responding priority in terms of money, time, effort,
and talent. Responding, which includes the American
reaction to both MTWs and SSCs, is “first among equals” of
the three functions (see Figure 1).

Figure 1
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While shaping and preparing have increased in importance
over the last decade, all the services and the Secretary of
Defense have stated that the primary mission of the U.S.
military is to “fight and win the nation’s wars”—i.e., to
respond. The fact that the “Respond Approach” to U.S.
military strategy represents continuity has some
advantages. For instance, the services and the unified
commands have existing programs to implement the
strategy, including the futures programs, operations plans,
and theater engagement plans. 138 In addition, the Respond
Approach concentrates on a type of threats that has posed
the greatest risk to U.S. national interests. Stressing the
ability and willingness of the U.S. military to respond to a
wide range of challenges has augmented deterrence and
helped preserve American leadership.
In geographic terms, the Respond Approach applies to
all regions of the world, but with some variations in the type
of military response that the United States would consider
(see Figure 2).

Figure 2
The Respond Approach does entail some strategic risks
and costs. For instance, it demands a large and highly
skilled force, and a large defense budget. The approach can
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only work if the United States retains a wide range of
military capabilities, from nuclear deterrence and
futures-oriented battle labs to special forces. It also requires
extensive strategic mobility, including airlift and sealift.
Both are expensive. Since the United States has
experienced the longest period of sustained economic
growth in its history, these demands have been met. There
is a chance that this growth can be sustained into coming
decades. But if the U.S. economy experiences major
problems, the response-oriented approach to military
strategy may prove unbearably expensive and political
support for it will erode. It is important to remember that
shifts in the health of the U.S. economy, along with changes
in the global security environment and technological
advances, are “independent variables” that can drive
changes in military strategy. The Response Approach is
appropriate for a nation experiencing sustained economic
expansion, but not for one undergoing economic slowdown
or contraction.
The Respond Approach also risks over-extension. Being
engaged in many regions of the world in many different
ways can cause weaknesses in other places. Clausewitz
warned “there is no higher and simpler law of strategy than
of keeping one’s forces concentrated.” 139 For a superpower
like the United States, this is impossible, but dispersion
always brings risk. By the same token, using the U.S.
military in SSCs and in shaping activities risks weakening
its ability to fight major wars. Recruitment and retention
become more difficult, maintenance and replacement of
equipment is delayed or postponed, and training schedules
constricted. However much forces trained for responding to
MTW can be used in shaping (or, preparing for the future),
this entails some cost in warfighting capabilities. Tradeoffs
and compromises are inevitable. This is acceptable today
because the probability of an MTW seems remote. If this
situation changes, the current strategy may entail
unacceptable risk to U.S. warfighting capabilities.
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A Respond Approach may discourage partners from
adequately developing their own military capabilities. This
charge, of course, is often made toward Europe. Even
though Western Europe has a population and economic
capacity that matches or exceeds that of the United States,
the combined strength of the region’s armed forces is far
below that of the U.S. military. It can be argued that Europe
has not undertaken efforts to increase defense spending and
augment its military capabilities because American
strategy commits the U.S. military to the region’s defense
and, if necessary, to lead such efforts. The inverse is also
true: by retaining a strategy based on power projection and
engagement in regions far from the United States where
tangible U.S. interests are limited, the current strategy
runs the risk of intimidating or alienating other states.
Americans invariably see U.S. military power as benign,
used only to promote democracy and human rights, and to
punish aggression. Other states do not necessarily share
this perception. Many worry about what they see as an
increasing heavy-handedness on the part of Washington
made possible by U.S. military prowess. Eventually other
states may attempt to lessen U.S. influence in their regions
or actively contain American power. The Respond Approach
increases the chances of this happening.
Engagement can cause partners and the American
public to overestimate the extent of Washington’s
commitment to a nation or a region. For example, the
United States military has been involved in a number of
programs designed to shape the security environment of
Sub-Saharan Africa and to improve ties with the region’s
militaries. 140 This might cause African leaders to assume
that the United States is willing to play an active and
integral role in the security of their region. But, in practice,
the United States has refused anything other than an
indirect role in African security. 141 Shaping can also lead
American policymakers to make commitments to areas of
little intrinsic interest because it seems like a low-cost thing
to do. When this happens, the United States begins to
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develop an interest in part to justify past efforts. The
tendency to reinforce failure is a military error but a
difficult thing to resist since withdrawing from a state or
region where U.S. forces have been involved in engagement
or shaping is an admission of strategic failure.
Shaping and engagement also risk “guilt by association.”
When a military that has undergone American training or
education, or which had held combined exercises with the
U.S. military commits human rights violations, undertakes
aggression, becomes corrupt, or intervenes in the political
system of its state, the United States is held partly
responsible. One example of this is the protracted protests
against the School of the Americas. All of the good done by
the school over the years in terms of imparting valuable
skills to Latin American militaries and helping shape their
attitudes toward civil-military relations is forgotten when a
tiny percentage of the school’s alumni commit human rights
violations. This could be repeated in other areas of the world
where the U.S. military undertakes shaping and
engagement activities, particularly with new democracies
and transitional states.
Finally, preparing now for an uncertain future also
entails some risks. The most pressing is the danger of “early
lock in” if predictions about the future prove incorrect. The
Army After Next Project, for instance, assumed that the
major challenge the United States will face in 2020 and
beyond will be “near peer competitors.” The Army then set
out to explore operational concepts, organizations, and
technology that would be useful against a near peer
competitor armed with some precision weapons, ballistic
missiles, weapons of mass destruction, and the like. The
risk is that the Army (or the rest of the Department of
Defense) may so commit itself to the predicted type of
function or threat that it overlooks others and is unprepared
for them. History has shown that it is often not the first state
to attempt to undertake a military revolution that truly
succeeds, but those that learn from and correct the mistakes
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of the leader. By leading the current revolution in military
affairs, the United States runs the chance of this.
Variant B: The Transformation Approach. The
“Transformation Approach” emerged from the 1997
National Defense Panel. The basic idea is that the United
States is currently experiencing a “strategic pause” with no
imminent, high-risk threats. This allows accepting greater
short-term risk by limiting global engagement, canceling
procurement of current or next-generation weapons
systems like the F-22 and Crusader, selectively lowering
current readiness and operational tempo, cutting some
force structure, and shrinking the defense infrastructure.
The savings that derive from these actions could then be
used to accelerate the development and adoption of
advanced systems, concepts, and organizations. In the
Transformation Approach, then, preparing for the future is
the priority (see Figure 3). If this is adopted and succeeds, it
could solidify American military preponderance for decades
to come, thus helping assure a more stable global security

Figure 3
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system and protecting U.S. national interests. This is an
enticing idea: Republican presidential nominee George W.
Bush, for instance, has adopted a position close to the
Transformation Approach. 142
The Transformation Approach is based on several
assumptions. First, while the United States is unlikely to
face a peer or near-peer competitor for several
decades—hence the “strategic pause”—this approach
assumes that one will eventually emerge or, at least, try to
emerge. If not, there would be no reason for the effort and
expense of transformation; any defense savings could be put
to other use. The Transformation Approach also assumes
that the United States has an accurate roadmap for the
current revolution in military affairs so that any changes
made bring strategic advantages. And, it is based on the
assumption that the U.S. military, in conjunction with
coalition partners and allies, can overcome immediate or
short-term challenges with existing technology and forces.
Today’s “rogue states” or regional aggressors, according to
this thinking, are growing weaker or, at best, standing still
rather than becoming more powerful. Iraq, for instance,
remains badly damaged by the Gulf War and a decade of
sanctions, while the armed forces of the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC) states are markedly stronger than they were
in the early 1990s. 143 The North Korean military is large,
but years of economic decay, isolation, and famine have
greatly weakened Pyongyang and paved the way for
movement toward political reconciliation between North
Korea and South Korea. While the possibility of North
Korean aggression cannot be ruled out in the short term, the
chances that it would succeed given the military and
economic power of South Korea and the American security
commitment to Seoul are very small. South Korea could
almost certainly defeat North Korea in a war today, and this
is unlikely to change. Iran—the third candidate enemy in a
potential MTW—is undertaking moderate improvement in
its armed forces but, unlike Iraq and North Korea, has not
waged aggressive war in recent years or given any other
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sign that it would like to invade and occupy the territory of
neighboring states.
A Transformation Approach to military strategy would
lead the United States to limit its involvement in regions of
modest or limited national interest. In most cases, these are
precisely the areas of the world where the demand for
multinational peacekeeping forces is the highest. In a
Transformation Approach, the United States would
probably only consider peacekeeping or stability operations
in high-value areas like the Caribbean or Central America.
In the short-term, a Transformation Approach would stress
what might be called “limited commitment” military forces
like aerospace and naval units rather than “high
commitment” forces like major land formations. It would
certainly accord higher priority to experimental units,
battle labs, concept development centers, war colleges,
wargaming centers, and DOD think tanks. Geographically,
a transformation approach to strategy could concentrate on
the regions of high, tangible U.S. interests, whether defined
by geography, economic ties, or formal commitments. The
core regions of the Caribbean Basin, North America,
Central America, NATO Europe, parts of the Pacific Rim,
and, to a lesser extent, the oil producing regions of the Gulf
would be important and warrant extensive military
engagement. Others would not.
The Transformation Approach entails higher short-term
and mid-term risk than the Respond Approach. Like the
Respond Approach, the Transformation Approach risks
intimidating other states and sparking arms races, the
adoption of asymmetric counters to American strength, and
the coalescence of coalitions or alliances designed to contain
U.S. power. Even today when foreign audiences hear that
the United States, which is more secure than any other
state on earth and probably more secure than any state has
been for centuries, is willing to spend billions of dollars for a
radical increase in its military capabilities, they assume
Washington intends to use this power to impose its will on
others.144 In the short term, a transformation approach to
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strategy runs some risk of encouraging an aggressor state to
strike out before the correlation of forces shifts even further
against it. The argument is sometimes made that Germany
began World War I because it was afraid that political
reforms and industrialization in Imperial Russia would
eventually shift the balance of power. Aggressors are most
dangerous when they perceive adverse trends. Today’s
aggressors might view a U.S. strategy based on transformation in this light. Similarly, the diminution of immediate
engagement called for by the Transformation Approach
might erode America’s position of global leadership. In
effect, Washington would be telling states outside of the core
regions, “Although we’re withdrawing from your area now,
we’ll be back in a few decades even stronger than before.”
But once a position of leadership is abandoned, it is very
difficult to regain. This means that a Transformation
Approach might permanently end U.S. leadership outside
the core areas.
Since no other state appears prepared to undertake the
transformation recommended by the National Defense
Panel, Office of Net Assessment, and Defense Science
Board, unless the United States is prepared to retain both a
“legacy” military and a transformed one, the process would
erode the ability of the U.S. military to operate in a
coalition.145 Finally, as with the Respond Approach, to
undertake transformation now risks pursuing the wrong
sorts of changes if predictions about the nature of future
armed conflict, the trajectory of change in the global
security environment, and the evolution of technology prove
wrong. If the U.S. military transforms prematurely, it may
find itself like the French forces that manned the Maginot
Line in 1940—unsurpassed at the sort of static defense that
characterized World War I but irrelevant for the rapid,
combined arms maneuver that dominated the first two
years of World War II.
Ultimately, the Transformation Approach entails
accepting greater short-term risk in expectation of a
long-term payoff. If one assumes that the United States has
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an accurate roadmap for transformation, that the current
strategy is economically unsustainable, that a substantial
American military preponderance over any conceivable
opponent should be sustained, that a decline in current U.S.
influence in some regions is acceptable or can be rectified at
a later date, and that the current “strategic pause” will
persist for several decades, the Transformation Approach
makes sense. If any of these assumptions do not hold, the
soundness of the Transformation Approach is questionable.
Variant C: The Shaping Approach. The “Shaping
Approach” grows from the conclusion that MTWs are
increasingly unlikely. The states that former National
Security Adviser Anthony Lake labeled “rogues” have been
recast by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright as “states of
concern,” suggesting that they are moderating,
disintegrating, or contained. 146 This, according to advocates
of the Shaping Approach to U.S. military strategy, gives the
United States a chance to place greater emphasis on the use
of the military for shaping and engagement (see Figure 4).
The idea is that this will preempt conflict, increase regional

Figure 4
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stability, augment the capabilities of American partners,
and deter the “states of concern.” It would also allow
significantly smaller defense budgets since shaping
activities are less costly than warfighting, and since greater
regional stability would allow force reductions.
While a Shaping Approach might initially demand an
increase in the size of the U.S. military in order to develop
relationships with a wide range of partner states, in the long
term it could lead to a smaller force by preempting conflicts
and increasing the ability of regional states to deal with
those that do occur. When this happens, the U.S. military
would stress support to allies and partners in areas where
they are weak and the United States is strong such as
command and control, intelligence, logistics, and
transportation. Combined exercises, particularly
multinational ones, would increase in number, size, and
frequency. Engagement units like Army Special Forces and
National Guard units with experience in state
“partnership” programs would be particularly important.
Geographically, a shaping approach would focus on regions
with emerging democracies, including Sub-Saharan Africa,
South Asia, Central Asia, Southeast Europe, the
Asia-Pacific Rim, the Caribbean, and Latin America. In
most instances, the United States would work closely with
existing regional security structures such as NATO, other
European security organizations, the Southern African
Development Council (SADC), the Economic Council of
West African States (ECOWAS), the East African
Community (EAC), the Organization of African Unity
(OAU), the Association of South East Asian Nations
(ASEAN), the Organization of American States (OAS), and
the GCC.
While a Shaping Approach would help save defense
dollars and potentially augment regional stability in some
parts of the world, it would be a risky venture if predictions
about the demise of large-scale war prove wrong.
Nondemocratic states might be tempted to pursue
aggression if the U.S. military no longer actively counters
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them. Even the traditional “rogues” might become
aggressive again. The influence of the United States might
then decline. Even if no invasions occur, regional partners of
the United States might be susceptible to intimidation. A
revived Iraq or Iran might coerce the GCC, while ASEAN
might, at some point, be intimidated by China. If shaping
fails, the U.S. military might have to reverse an act of
aggression that might have been deterred or thwarted, thus
raising the risk and cost to U.S. and friendly forces.
Moreover, a Shaping Approach assumes that the recent
democratic reforms and economic growth will continue.
Clearly the U.S. military would not undertake engagement
with oppressive, nondemocratic partners. It is possible that
the first decade of the 21 st century will prove to be the high
water mark of political reform and democratization, with
regression toward authoritarianism or fragmentation
taking place as the political and economic expectations of
the citizens of transitional states are frustrated. A Shaping
Approach also runs the risks mentioned earlier: guilt by
association, creeping commitment, and over extension.
Variant D: The Warfighting Approach. The first three
variants of the shape/respond/prepare strategy are closely
related. The final variant—the “Warfighting Approach”—
represents a more substantial alteration. Like the
Responding Approach, the Warfighting Approach is based
on the belief that shaping, engagement, and preparing
should be secondary functions for the U.S. military.
Advocates of this position feel strongly that the purpose of
the American military is to fight and win the nation’s wars
(with war defined as traditional, large-scale combat
involving state militaries). Everything else is a distraction.
Shaping and preparing may be necessary, but they are
distractions. What distinguishes the Warfighting Approach
from the Respond Approach is the separation of major war
from smaller scale contingencies. The warfighting approach
is based on the belief that the focus of the American military
should be MTWs or, at least, large-scale war, with SSCs
accorded lower priority (see Figure 5). Like the
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Transformation Approach, the Warfighting Approach
advocates diminishing American engagement in shaping
and SSCs. But, rather than doing this as a means of shifting
resources to transformation efforts, the warfighting
approach advocates diminished engagement strictly on the
basis of strategic prudence: by expending so much time,
effort, and money in regions of the world less important to
the United States, Washington is increasing the risk to U.S.
interests in the core regions. The Warfighting Approach
assumes that the qualitative gap between the U.S. military
and potential adversaries will remain acceptable if strategic
distractions are minimized and funding for maintenance
and upgrades is adequate, so there is no need for a dramatic
transformation in the short- to mid-term. What is needed is
concentration on threats that pose a risk to truly vital
national interests, specifically large-scale aggression in core
regions of the world.

Figure 5
One advantage of the Warfighting Approach to U.S.
military strategy is that it would facilitate force and concept
development by focusing on specific geostrategic zones and
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according clear priority to the MTW mission. The wider the
range of functions performed by any organization, the more
complicated planning and development become and the
greater the risk of failure in one function or the other. If the
U.S. military could focus solely on MTWs, force and concept
development would be both easier and, possibly, more
effective. Along these same lines, a Warfighting Approach to
strategy would clarify the qualities desired among both
enlisted personnel and officers. The “warfighter” attitude
would be unambiguously prized and cultivated. In all
likelihood, programs to change the institutional culture and
makeup of the military would be de-emphasized. A
Warfighting Approach to strategy might also augment
deterrence against potential aggressors who contemplate
traditional cross-border war. There would be no chance that
they might consider the U.S. military so distracted and
over-extended that it could not respond to aggression. A
Warfighting Approach might also improve morale within
the military and make recruitment and retention easier.
There is concern today that extensive involvement of the
armed forces in shaping, engagement, and SSCs erodes
morale. Within the U.S. military, activities like
participation in multinational peacekeeping are sometimes
called (with intended sarcasm) “operations other than what
I signed up for.” And, since major wars occur only
infrequently, the deployment rate of the forces would
decline. This would improve the quality of life for military
personnel and extend the life of equipment. In all
probability, the defense budget could be lowered or, at least,
kept steady since the military could focus on a more limited
range of functions and systems.
The force structure implications of the warfighting
approach are clear: units and organizations designed for
shaping, engagement, or transformation activities would be
minimized, and those designed for MTW stressed. Any
moves to “lighten” the Army would have to be designed so as
to not detract from its capability for sustained combat. Light
land forces like the 82d Airborne Division, 101 st Airborne
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Division (Air Assault) and Marine Expeditionary Forces
would be accorded second priority or focused on deploying
early in an MTW and delaying aggressor forces until heavy
units arrived. Geographically, a Warfighting Approach to
strategy would concentrate on areas where U.S. national
interests are extensive and major war is possible,
specifically NATO’s eastern perimeter, the Persian Gulf,
and Northeast Asia. There would be little or no U.S. military
involvement in Africa, Central Asia, Latin America, and
South Asia.
While the Warfighting Approach to U.S. military
strategy would be a more focused and cheaper one than the
current strategy, it would entail an increase in both
short-term and long-term risk. By abandoning shaping and
engagement activities, conflicts that might have been
deterred or avoided may break out. The U.S. military would
play only a limited role in smaller conflicts in noncore
regions. This would erode the position of leadership
currently held by the United States and could leave the U.S.
military unable to perform functions demanded of it by the
American people and their elected leaders. The American
people want their military to be able to end or prevent
egregious human suffering. The Warfighting Approach
disregards this. And, since much of the American public and
many of its elected leaders feel that the threat of MTW
involving rogue states is declining, the Warfighting
Approach to U.S. military strategy may not be politically
supportable.
Alternative II: A Counter-Asymmetry Strategy.
The idea behind the counter-asymmetry strategy is that
responding to existing or potential threats should, in fact,
remain the central focus of American military strategy, but
the current strategy prepares for the wrong kind of
challenge. While a cross-border invasion by the armored
columns of Iraq, Iran, or North Korea is improbable, the
United States and its allies are likely to face asymmetric
75

threats of one kind or the other. As former Army Chief of
Staff General Dennis Reimer admitted, “nobody is going to
go against us, tank against tank, soldier against solider.
Instead, potential enemies will look for asymmetrical
responses.” 147 The counter-asymmetry approach to U.S.
military strategy recognizes this and would adjust force
structure, operational concepts, and equipment accordingly
(see Figure 6).

Figure 6
The question then becomes: what forms of asymmetry
will be most common and, more importantly, most
problematic for the United States? So far, the Department
of Defense has focused on two broad categories of
asymmetry: that designed to thwart the deployment of the
U.S. military, and that designed to deter or defeat the
United States by raising the cost of a military operation,
particularly an MTW or SSC. A counter-deployment
strategy would probably rely on missiles, other precision
munitions, submarines, naval mines, and weapons of mass
destruction to complicate the strategic and inter-theater
movement of the U.S. military. This could involve strikes on
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embarkation points and supporting infrastructure in the
United States, on forces enroute to a theater via air or by
sea, and on bases, troop formations, and support
infrastructure in theater. A full spectrum counterdeployment strategy would also attempt to dissuade other
nations from providing the U.S. military with overflight,
transit, or basing rights. To prevent a counter-deployment
strategy from working, the U.S. military would need the
means to minimize its footprint in theater, protect
deploying forces from their home bases to the point of
employment in theater, and project power from outside the
range of enemy weapons whenever possible.
An asymmetric strategy designed to deter or defeat the
United States by raising the cost of a military operation
would probably seek to erode American will by increasing
casualties and dragging the conflict out. Sun Tzu wrote,
“there has never been a protracted war from which a
country has benefited.” 148 This may be an overgeneralization, but it certainly holds for the United States today.
Time is generally not on America’s side in 21 st century
wars, in large part because the United States often fights in
defense of important interests while its enemies fight for
vital ones. An enemy could drag a conflict out and target
American will in a number of ways. Terrorism could be
used against Americans and American facilities in theater,
within the United States, or around the world. The threat
or use of WMD terrorism might be particularly effective,
especially if it takes place on American soil. Cyberattacks
and information terrorism could be used against critical
nodes of the U.S. infrastructure, including the
transportation, communication, and financial systems.
Even enemies unable to project power via terrorism or
cyberattacks could seek to increase the cost of a military
operation to the United States by guerrilla warfare and
operations in complex terrain, particularly urban areas.
Urban conflict diminishes the effectiveness of U.S. sensor
webs and erodes precision. It largely negates the immense
American advantage in stand-off military capabilities. It
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also increases the chances of civilian casualties which are
often of greater concern to the United States than to its
enemies.
Any enemy employing this type of asymmetric strategy
would not necessarily have to take action to increase the
cost of intervention for U.S. forces. A calculating enemy
could combine this strategy with temporal asymmetric
methods. In doing so, the enemy could assess the level of
aggression that would be required to provoke a U.S.
response and be sure to keep aggressive acts below that
level. By developing incremental aggression of this nature
over time, a determined enemy could achieve regional
dominance. The more costly it is to deploy U.S. forces in both
political and economic terms, the sooner the enemy could
reach its goals. This argues for a more agile and versatile
U.S. military.
There are other types of asymmetric challenges that are
feasible, but have not yet received adequate analysis. Two
are particularly troubling. One might be called
political-ethical asymmetry. An enemy attempting this
would use information technology and the interconnectedness of the 21 st century world to have certain
technologies or capabilities in which the U.S. military has
an advantage prohibited or controlled. Based on the
experience of the anti-landmine movement—which made
extensive use of the Internet—a parallel movement to
control or ban nonlethal weapons is already coalescing. The
same may occur in other arenas, including the use of space
for military purposes, the use of military robotics, and
information warfare. Opponents using political-ethical
asymmetry during an actual conflict would seek to
manipulate opinion within the United States and among
neutral states, again making extensive use of the Internet
to communicate and link like-thinking organizations. The
interconnectedness of the modern world, particularly the
fact that information technology has given most of the world
an understanding of the American psyche, will probably
augment the ability of America’s enemies to craft effective
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psychological campaigns. In all likelihood, the leaders of
future U.S. opponents will have spent time in the United
States and, perhaps, have graduated from an American
university, thus making them much more psychologically
savvy than bumpkins like Saddam Hussein. The Zapatista
movement in Mexico is a model for groups crafting a
strategy based on political-ethical asymmetry. This group,
in conjunction with a plethora of left-leaning Latin
Americanists and human rights organizations, used the
Internet to build international support with web pages
housed on servers at the University of California,
Swarthmore, and the University of Texas. 149 This electronic
coalition-building was so sophisticated that a group of
researchers from the RAND Corporation labeled it “social
netwar.”150 Undoubtedly, more organizations will follow
this path, blending the expertise of traditional political
movements with the cutting-edge advertising and
marketing techniques that the information revolution has
spawned.
A second type of asymmetry that the U.S. military may
face concerns opponents organized as networks rather than
as hierarchies. To avoid American strengths, such enemies
might undertake strategic as well as tactical dispersion.
There will be few sanctuaries in an era of global linkages,
pervasive sensor webs, and standoff weapons, so networked
enemies might spread their command and control
apparatus around the world with their commanders
exerting control from a lap top computer, satellite modem,
and web cam situated anywhere in the world, with their
transmissions encrypted and bounced throughout the web
in order to complicate tracing. Networked enemies might
connect themselves to a broader global network unified by
opposition to the existing political and economic order. For
instance, an insurgent network attempting to overthrow
the government of a state friendly to the United States
might cultivate loose ties with a range of titular allies
including global criminal cartels, anti-government groups
within the United States, or other political groups seeking
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to constrain American power. Involvement in crime might
allow networked enemies to buy the state-of-the-art talent
in key areas like information security or offensive
information warfare, thus making them equal or superior to
the security forces confronting them. Such an opponent
would pose serious challenges to a U.S. military that has
retained a focus on MTWs.
Given all this, a counter-asymmetry approach to U.S.
military strategy would de-emphasize forces and
capabilities used for traditional force-on-force combat in
open terrain, and focus instead on counter-terrorism,
homeland defense, missile defense, urban operations,
operations without large in-theater bases, dispersed
nonlinear operations, military robotics, and other activities
that might thwart asymmetric activities. The U.S. military
would also need to develop hybrid hierarchy-networked
organizations to counter networked opponents. The
problem for American strategists is that they cannot know
what sorts of asymmetric methods future enemies might
use, or what might deter or counter them. Certainly the U.S.
military has faced asymmetric enemies in the past such as
the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong, or the Somali militias.
In both conflicts, the United States eventually lost (or, at
least, experienced what was perceived as a defeat). But
future enemies may or may not emulate the Vietnamese or
Somalis. The most dangerous enemy would be one that
somehow melds substantial conventional capability with
asymmetric methods. It is also not clear whether
asymmetric challenges can be deterred, or if they must be
thwarted once they emerge. If the United States adopted a
counter-asymmetry approach to strategy, certain changes
could take place in the short-term, but the ultimate outcome
would only be determined once the nature of the threat
became clearer.
Because the nature of the asymmetric challenges the
United States will face in coming decades is not clear, the
primary risk of a counter-asymmetry approach is guessing
wrong. The United States could undertake great efforts to
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prepare for a type of enemy or a type of conflict that never
emerges. This would not only be expensive, but could also
undercut support from the American public and its elected
leaders, and erode morale within the U.S. military.
Ultimately, preparing for the wrong kind of asymmetric
threat could be just as dangerous as not preparing at all.
There is also the same risk seen in several other strategic
approaches under consideration, that shifting the focus of
the American military away from MTW might make it more
likely to occur. In all probability, the time is not yet right for
the United States to shift to a counter-asymmetry strategy.
Alternative III: Preventive Defense.
All variants of the shape/respond/prepare strategy
reflect the belief that the United States has three levels of
national interest—vital, important, and humanitarian—
and that U.S. military power should be used to promote or
protect all three so long as the expected costs and risks are
in accordance with the significance of the interest at stake.
It is, in other words, a military strategy appropriate for a
superpower that has the ability and the will to become
involved in many kinds of issues and in many places. There
is a growing movement, though, that contends that such an
unlimited national security strategy will ultimately prove
insolvent. Thus the United States needs to resist the
temptation to use military force on problems and issues that
are ultimately peripheral or secondary and focus on truly
important national interests. The United States needs a
national security strategy of constraint and focus rather
than one of unconstrained enlargement and engagement.
One instance of support for a more constrained and
focused national security strategy is seen from what is
called The Commission on America’s National Interests, a
blue-ribbon panel affiliated with the Harvard University
Center for Science and International Affairs, the Nixon
Center, and the RAND Corporation. This group includes a
stellar line-up of former policymakers, current political
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leaders, strategic analysts, and likely future policymakers
including Robert Ellsworth, Andrew Goodpaster, Rita
Hauser, Graham T. Allison, Dimitri Simes, James
Thomson, Robert Blackwill, Sam Nunn, Richard Armitage,
Bob Graham, John McCain, Condoleezza Rice, and Brent
Scowcroft. The Commission has concluded that the United
States is today a “superpower adrift” that has lost its
focus.151 They propose a slight refinement of the categories
of U.S. national interests, dividing them into “vital,”
“extremely important,” “important,” and “less important or
secondary.” But while this led the Commission to advocate
lessened or minimal engagement in secondary issues like
Africa or the Balkans and greater attention to homeland
defense and proliferation, the actual recommendations for
American military strategy were not radical. The
Commission stated, for instance, that the U.S. military
must retain the ability to conduct large-scale military
operations in two parts of the world simultaneously. 152 The
only real change in U.S. military strategy was diminished
engagement in shaping and peacekeeping.
After leaving office, former Secretary of Defense William
J. Perry and former Assistant Secretary of Defense Ashton
B. Carter offered another approach to refocusing U.S.
defense strategy. They began arguing in favor of a return to
the “preventive-defense strategy” that they had espoused
while in the Pentagon. 153 The experience, influence, and
wisdom of these two thinkers automatically gave the
concept credence. Preventive defense is a blend of the
transformation and shaping approaches, with some
significant distinctions. Perry and Carter accept the idea
that U.S. military preponderance is both desirable and
sustainable. But, they contend, the Department of Defense
and the Services are not adapting quickly enough to
changes in the global security environment. This may
eventually undercut or challenge American military
preponderance.
Perry and Carter contend that the existing strategy
inverts the appropriate priority of effort. They divide the
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threats and tasks which U.S. defense strategy deals with
into an “A,” “B,” and “C” list. The “C” list includes conflicts
and humanitarian disasters which do not threaten
America’s vital interests. This list is, of course, extensive,
and includes Kosovo, Bosnia, East Timor, Haiti, Rwanda,
and Somalia. “What is striking,” writes Joseph S. Nye, “is
how the ‘C’ list has come to dominate today’s foreign policy
agenda.”154 This may be striking, but it understandable.
Conflicts of this type mesmerize the public. The suffering
they bring is immediate and public, broadcast around the
world as it occurs. While Perry and Carter do not say it, the
intimation is that the current strategy has given such
conflicts more attention than they warrant because
President Clinton has been more prone to use public opinion
as a guide for security policy than any other recent U.S.
leader. This led to U.S. military involvement in places that
were, by objective standards, peripheral. Perry and Carter’s
“B” list includes threats to U.S. interests that are deterrable
or defeatable with existing forces, particularly MTWs in
Northeast and Southwest Asia. While these do pose a
serious challenge, they do not threaten U.S. survival, way of
life, or position in the world, especially if the U.S. military
retains its qualitative advantage over the armed forces of
rogue states by capitalizing on the revolution in military
affairs. But despite this, Perry and Carter argue, the “B” list
shapes most of the force structure of the U.S. military and
consumes most of the defense budget. The military
described in JV 2010 and JV 2020, for instance,
concentrates almost wholly on “B” list threats. The “A” list,
by contrast, includes things that might challenge the
survival, way of life, and position in the world of the United
States. There are no imminent “A” list threats in traditional
military terms, but they might emerge if the United States
does not take steps today to head them off. Specific “A” list
dangers include:

•

The danger that Russia might descend into chaos,
isolation, and aggression;
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•

The danger that Russia and other Soviet successor
states might lose control of their weapons of mass
destruction;

•

The danger that China could become increasingly
hostile;

•

The danger that weapons of mass destruction will
proliferate and present a direct military threat to U.S.
forces and territory;

•

The danger that catastrophic terrorism might occur
on U.S. territory. 155

Such issues do not capture the headlines like “C” list
humanitarian disasters but, according to Perry and Carter,
will determine the future security of the United States.
The appropriate response to “A” list dangers is to
prevent them from developing and, if that fails, prepare to
meet them. Preventive defense is thus a strategy that “seeks
to forestall dangerous A-list developments before they
require drastic military remedies.” 156 It entails engagement
and shaping but, in contrast to existing shaping activities,
would concentrate on “A” list issues rather than “B” and “C”
list ones. Engagement with Russia and China matters;
engagement with Uganda or Paraguay is less important.
“A” list shaping activities might include a range of
cooperative threat reduction programs, military-to-military
contacts like combined exercises, training, and planning,
and cooperative ventures pairing the U.S. military and U.S.
allies with Russia and China. In addition, Perry and Carter
advocate bringing greater coherence to the way the United
States approaches terrorism, particularly on American soil.
This should tightly integrate the military into the
prevention of and response to terrorism. In terms of force
structure and budget priorities, Perry and Carter favor
devoting greater effort to countering asymmetric
challenges. In particular, they mention defenses against
weapons of mass destruction and missiles, information
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warfare capabilities, protection of critical domestic
infrastructure, and protection of forces and facilities used
for power projection. They also recommend organizational
reforms that would further augment jointness and provide a
central systems architecture to take advantage of the
information revolution.
The preventive defense strategy is based on several key
assumptions. The most important is that shaping activities
on the part of the U.S. military can have a positive effect on
developments in China and Russia, and can lower the
danger from terrorism. The preventive defense strategy
also assumes that the threat from rogue states will, at
worst, remain steady and may actually decrease, so a
modest improvement in U.S. forces will preserve an
adequate military advantage. Finally, preventive defense
assumes that “C” list problems will not expand or escalate
into more serious threats. They can, in other words, be
handled with a very modest effort or even ignored, with no
long-term repercussions.
Risks arise if any of these assumptions prove false. It is
at least conceivable that both Beijing and Moscow are
determined to expand or reconstitute their influence. If this
is true, military-to-military engagement on the part of the
United States would only strengthen them and speed up the
process of defense modernization. If, in fact, either of these
two powers are actually seeking greater influence and a
diminution of U.S. influence, the appropriate American
strategy would be to contain and weaken them, perhaps by
playing on internal schisms. After all, the United States
sought to shape Soviet behavior immediately after World
War II through offers of assistance and by designing the
United Nations in a way that gave Moscow a great degree of
influence. This failed because it was based on the flawed
assumption that Stalin’s objectives and world view were
essentially the same as Washington’s. It is possible that
preventive defense could repeat this strategic
miscalculation. In the case of rogue states, the preventive
defense strategy carries the same risk as many other
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proposals: the emphasis the United States has placed on
MTW may very well have deterred it. To de-emphasize it
may weaken this deterrence. Finally, by ignoring “C” list
crises or minimizing U.S. participation in them, the
preventive defense strategy could weaken U.S. leadership
in places like Africa and South Asia (assuming this is
desirable) and could allow internal wars and humanitarian
disasters to spread. In other words, sparks left untended
can turn into bonfires. If one accepts the notion of contagion
or “death by a thousand small cuts”—ideas given greater
credence by ongoing processes of globalization and
interconnectedness—preventive defense may be an
extraordinarily risky strategy.
Alternative IV: Supporting Regional Structures.
Alternatives I through III are distinguished by the
priority given the missions and tasks that the U.S. military
currently performs. Alternatives IV and V suggest more
substantial changes in how the U.S. military might perform
its tasks or the nature of the tasks themselves. For instance,
a strategy based on supporting regional structures would
commit the U.S. military to develop concepts, doctrine,
technology, and organizations designed specifically to
strengthen friendly states and coalitions during peacetime,
crisis, and war. Current strategy notes that the U.S.
military usually operates with partners, but in every type of
coalition operation except peacekeeping in peripheral
areas, the United States plans to be the dominant member.
A strategy of supporting regional structures would reverse
this so that the normal state of affairs would be for the U.S.
military to be the supporting coalition partner rather than
the supported one.
There are solid geostrategic and political reasons that
such a shift would make sense. Robert W. Tucker writes,
“Once again Americans are in a period of increasing
contention over foreign policy...The central issue in the
present debate is a recurring one: whether America should
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act alone or with others.” 157 All of the alternative strategies
discussed so far share a belief in the desirability of U.S.
dominance in both the peacetime maintenance of regional
security and in forming and leading military responses to
crises or acts of aggression. As Peter Rodman—an
unabashed advocate of the preservation of American
preeminence—points out, there is growing unease about
Washington’s unilateralism even among friends. 158 This is
due in large part to the sometimes clumsy and
heavy-handed way that the United States has exercised
global leadership. U.S. military strategy is a perfect
illustration of this. Washington has sought a major role in
the design and maintenance of nearly every regional
security system. The United States seeks friends and allies,
but always makes them junior partners. This made perfect
sense during the Cold War and in its immediate aftermath
when only the United States could orchestrate regional
security but, as the global security system matures and
regional structures form and solidify, U.S. dominance could
become unsustainable and counterproductive. “The rising
indictment at home as well as abroad of a dominant
America,” writes Tucker, “is the result not of what this
nation has done in the world, but...what it sooner or later
will do. And even if this view misreads the American
disposition, other nations will still be only too ready to
believe that it does not.” 159
In addition to the risk of provoking opposition, the
insistence on dominating regional security systems is
expensive. As discussed earlier, American strategy and
budgets are unsynchronized. U.S. dominance contributes to
this. It is also politically risky, easily intimidating or
alienating other states as they come to question American
dominance of their part of the world. U.S. dominance also
risks losing the support of the American people if blood and
money continue to be expended in far away places. The
intense effort by both the Bush and Clinton administrations
to justify global engagement shows that American political
leaders recognize the fragility of public support for it. Calls
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for American withdrawal from some regions are only one
disaster away. Given all this, a strategy in which the main
focus is to help build and strengthen emerging regional
security structures might be more affordable and
sustainable than a U.S.-dominated one in which enemies
are defeated by American-led coalitions. (see Figure 7).

Figure 7
A U.S. strategy of supporting regional security
structures would reflect the fact that local states are more
interested in and better able to understand their region’s
security than Americans. It would also take advantage of
the fact that regional and subregional security organs are
taking form in nearly all parts of the world. At the political
level, such a strategy would help with the formation of
multinational security structures where none exist, and
assist with the development of those that do. During
peacetime, the U.S. military would augment the
effectiveness of regional structures, primarily through
support to regional exercises, combined training, and
professional military education. During crises or conflict,
the United States would provide support to regional
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structures according to specific needs. This might be
improved command and control, missile defense,
intelligence support, transportation, medical or other types
of combat support, and combat service support. In some
instances, the United States might bolster a regional
structure with long-range fire support or even landpower.
To perform this support function, the U.S. military, both the
CINCs and the services, would need some reorganization.
Currently, if the U.S. Army provides support to an allied
military, it often has to strip units, supplies, and equipment
from its own divisions. In a strategy based on support to
regional structures, the U.S. Army would form dedicated
support divisions specifically designed to augment allies in
areas where they are weak. At the same time, the United
States would retain effective combat units for those
instances where regional structures are inadequate or
where conditions dictate unilateral American military
actions. It would also continue a robust process of
experimentation to explore and integrate emerging
capabilities.
An associated strategy of supporting regional structures
entails two important types of risk. The first is the risk that
allied or partner states may not be able to defeat aggression
on their own. In the long term, though, this argument
becomes circular. Allies have been able to keep their defense
budgets lower than might be necessary because they could
rely on the United States to preserve regional stability. If
U.S. strategy made clear that it would support regional
actors but not substitute for them, this might change.
Ultimately, though, this is an assumption. If key regional
actors are not willing or able to shoulder a greater burden
for security, then a strategy based on supporting them could
fail to protect important U.S. national interests. And even in
cases where regional actors are willing to pay the price to
protect their interests, the United States in its supporting
role will sacrifice control over the extent to which U.S.
interests are protected or promoted.
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Another risk is that a strategy of supporting regional
structures might lead to a decline in the ability of the United
States to dictate or control the outcome of crises and
conflicts around the world. This is undeniable, but may not
be undesirable. There are regions like Europe that could
manage their own security today if forced to. Even if the
United States is not a major player in determining how this
transpires, the outcome is not likely to be adverse to U.S.
interests. Put simply, the cost of retaining U.S. dominance
of the European security system today may not be worth the
political and economic costs. In other regions with less
effective existing security systems (or less potential to build
them), the role of the United States would vary according to
geography and the extent of American national interests.
Clearly the U.S. role in Sub-Saharan Africa should be
limited, while that in Pacific Rim, Central America, and the
Caribbean more substantial. In all regions, though, the first
choice strategic option should be to strengthen regional
structures.
A third problem with a strategy of supporting regional
structures has to do with the command and control of U.S.
forces. While there have been some rare exceptions, the
American public as well as governmental leaders have been
loathe to place U.S. troops under foreign command. The
current administration has been the most willing to
consider this but still drew a clear line when it came to
giving foreign leaders command of U.S. forces as when, for
instance, PDD 25 stated that the president would never
relinquish command authority over U.S. forces but would
consider placing U.S. forces under operational control of a
competent U.N. commander for specific U.N. operations
authorized by the Security Council. A future, more
conservative administration can be expected to object more
strenuously. Nonetheless, it is difficult to conceive of a
combined command structure in which U.S. forces are
purely supporting an allied force but not under the
command of a foreign military leader.
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This strategy is not, then, one of disengagement but one
built on a fundamentally different form of engagement. To
adopt it would require a massive psychological adjustment
on the part of Americans plus clear, committed and vigorous
leadership from the highest levels. One of the most crucial
yet difficult components of leadership is knowing when not
to exercise authority or control. Great leaders—whether
individuals or nations—master this skill. For states,
dominance is intoxicating but, history suggests, it is also
fleeting. Better to control its passing than to have it wrested
from you.
Alternative V: Strategic Reconfiguration.
The 1995 Commission on Roles and Missions was
intended to take a hard look at the division of labor among
the services and the Department of Defense. The CORM,
though, offered only the most cautious recommendations,
leaving the Cold War division-of-labor intact. Now it might
be appropriate to revisit that issue and consider whether
the U.S. military should undergo a true strategic
reconfiguration. In this alternative, the vital tasks of
American strategy would remain the same: responding to
MTWs, responding to SSCs, shaping/engagement, and
preparing for the future. All components of the armed forces
and the Department of Defense would stress preparation,
particularly experimentation and concept development.
But, responsibility for the immediate tasks—MTWs, SSCs,
and shaping/engagement—would be reassigned.
Since the concept of MTWs entered discussions of
American military strategy in the early 1990s, defense
leaders agreed that the proper response was an all-service
effort utilizing every element of American military power.
This made sense when MTWs were likely and were
dangerous enough to constitute the central focus of U.S.
military strategy. Today, the rogue states which might
instigate MTW have, to one degree or the other, been
contained. Regional structures to defend against
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MTW—whether the South Korean military or the
GCC—are stronger than they were ten years ago. This
means that the chances of an MTW occurring at all are
small. And, if one does occur, the chances that an aggressor
will succeed or an act of aggression will be reversed are
miniscule. Even if a rogue state could grab a piece of
territory and hold it, the political and economic costs of this
action would far outweigh any benefits. Other
characteristics of MTW also suggest that the U.S. military
should rethink them. Only states can instigate MTW.
States are inherently more “deterrable” than non-state
actors since they usually have some system for rational
strategy-making which allows them to grasp the likely
consequences of aggression. In addition, states are
vulnerable to other means of pressure or coercion such as
economic sanctions. It is easier to identify likely sources of
MTWs and to deter them than for SSCs. Currently MTWs:

•

Are diminishing in likelihood;

•

Are easier to predict in terms of location and outbreak
than SSCs;

•

Are more deterrable than SSCs;

•

Involve fewer political constraints and broader rules
of engagement, since they are instigated by
aggression and likely to generate international
disapproval.

This suggests the United States should move away from
the use of Desert Storm-style MTWs as the central building
block of military strategy. Certainly the U.S. military must
retain some capability to help thwart challenges of this
type, but will find that they are unlikely to occur and, if they
do, primary responsibility for stopping them will be in the
hands of regional actors. If an MTW does occur, the role of
the U.S. military is likely to be standoff fires to stop an
invasion in its early stages, and support to regional actors
who play the primary role in defeating or reversing the
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invasion. Most of the close combat, in other words, could and
should be handled by regional forces. The same holds for
SSCs, but the U.S. military is likely to be called on for these
sorts of missions, whether involving non-combat activities
like humanitarian relief or protracted, low-level war. Some
SSCs will be amenable to standoff strikes but many of them
will require “hands on” effort for full mission accomplishment, particularly those where saving noncombatant lives
is a primary goal. In these, American land forces, both Army
and Marines, will play the most vital roles. This is not an
issue of high-tech versus low-tech approaches. In fact, there
is a great need for an effort to apply RMA-type emerging
technology to SSCs rather than to purely focus on major war
as is currently done. Strategic reconfiguration, then, would
entail: (1) refocusing American strategy so that SSCs are
equal to or have a higher priority than MTWs in terms of
force shaping, doctrine development, procurement, and
research; and, (2) refocusing U.S. land forces on SSCs.
Strategic reconfiguration would demand the greatest
degree of change from the Army. The Air Force and Navy
are already configured for standoff strikes in an MTW
environment; the Marines are already focused on SSCs. The
Army, though, would need to change its stress on sustained,
heavy combat and continue the type of transformation
directed by General Shinseki toward a more rapidly
deployable, middle weight force. It would also need to make
other adjustments to organization and concepts to become
more effective at SSCs, engagement, and shaping. At the
same time, the boundary between the functions of the Army
and the Marines would need to be rethought. If the Army
becomes more active in SSCs, shaping, and engagement,
and the Marines continue to develop the capability to
operate further from the shore than in the past, there will be
increasing overlap between the two and, potentially,
increasing competition.
Strategic reconfiguration, then, is based on several
assumptions:
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•

MTWs instigated by cross border aggression by rogue
states whose military is an armor-heavy Soviet-style
one are becoming less likely;

•

Should MTW occur, it could be defeated and reversed
by a combination of regional forces, standoff
American fires, and other methods of American
support;

•

SSCs, shaping, and engagement will be the primary
tasks of the U.S. military;

•

SSCs, shaping, and engagement usually are not
amenable to standoff solutions.

If all of these assumptions hold, strategic reconfiguration
entails acceptable risk. If any of them do not hold, strategic
reconfiguration could increase the chances that aggressor
states will instigate MTW, make ultimate defeat of MTWs
impossible or more costly, and, as a result, diminish U.S.
influence in those regions where MTWs are possible.
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PART III:
THE EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN STRATEGY

Three types of relationships form the building blocks of
American national security strategy. Relationships of
affinity bind the United States and other states and
organizations that share its core values: belief in open
government, rule by law, human rights, the market system,
and the desirability of creating stable systems for regional
security. Some relationships of affinity are long-standing
such as those with Canada, Great Britain, and Australia;
others are medium term like the relationships with Israel,
Germany, and Japan; and some are newer, connecting the
United States and states that have recently undergone
democratic transitions. Relationships of necessity are more
complex. They can be based on either some form of
partnership or on containment. One type of relationship of
necessity links the United States to other states that are
important because of their military, economic, and political
power. Clearly Russia, China, and India are the most
significant states of this type. Other relationships of
necessity link the United States and nations important
because of geographic location or possession of vital natural
resources. A third type of relationship of necessity links the
United States to states important because of aggressive
intent. This clearly includes the traditional “rogues” like
Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. The third form of strategic
relationship is one of humanity. This would certainly
characterize the ties between Washington and most of the
states of Sub-Saharan Africa, as well as others in Asia and
Latin America. The key question in relationships of
humanity is the salience of humanitarian intervention
using force. Current U.S. strategy accepts this with
conditions, especially limits on the U.S. role and the
participation of partners, but this may change in the future.
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A relationship between the United States and an
individual state or organization may mix elements of
affinity, necessity, and humanity. Some relationships are
based on a one of these elements, some two, some all three.
Relationships often evolve and mature. U.S.-Mexican ties,
for instance, were once based purely on geographic
necessity, but appear to be evolving into ones based more on
affinity. And, the nature of the relationship between the
United States and another state is largely determined by
the actions and intent of the other state. In any case, the
U.S. military is a vital component in relationships of affinity
and necessity, and an important one in relationships of
humanity. Much of strategy can be distilled into decisions
concerning the priority and forms of these relationships.
Even as U.S. strategy approaches the point of great
decisions that will shape the future, the Army tends to think
operationally rather than strategically. To think in terms of
the rapid deployment of force rather than conflict
prevention or resolution seems to be enough. In an era of
strategic transition, this is an encumbrance. To assure its
long-term relevance, the Army needs to place greater
emphasis on strategic level analysis. The confluence of the
2001 QDR, a presidential transition, and the Army’s
transformation process provide an excellent opportunity to
do this. This begins with basic concepts—what should be
done and what could be done.
The Army makes three defining contributions to the
joint team. The first is versatility. The Army covers a larger
part of the spectrum of military tasks than any of the other
Services. It is capable of sustained conventional combat
using both close engagement and precision, standoff strikes.
It can seize and hold territory, and undertake the
post-conflict reconstruction of a defeated enemy. It is
proficient at peacekeeping, nation building, peacetime
engagement, and special operations. Deployment of the
Army also remains the greatest symbol of American
commitment, so it carries political weight. The second
defining Army contribution to the joint team is ability to
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attain strategically decisive results in war. Decisiveness is
not an “either/or” condition, but rather a spectrum of
outcomes (see Figure 8). Standoff strikes, if done
appropriately, can approach the upper range of
decisiveness, theoretically even collapsing the enemy’s will
(although this has never been accomplished). Only effective
landpower, though, can attain the full spectrum of
decisiveness. It is possible that the United States will not
seek the upper ranges of decisiveness in the contemporary
security environment. But to be denuded of the capability
for full-spectrum decisiveness erodes deterrence since only
the upper range of decisiveness strips an aggressor of the
ability to “fight again another day.” In addition, if the U.S.
military does not have the capability of attaining the upper
ranges of the spectrum of decisiveness, the options available
to American political leaders is more limited.
The third defining Army contribution to the joint team is
the potential to provide broad-spectrum support to an allies
and friends. The fact that the U.S. Army itself has such a
wide range of capabilities gives it the ability to assist allies

Figure 8
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with everything from urban combat, to engineering and
logistics, through command and control of land formations.
The Army is not currently configured to provide support to
allies and friends with maximum effectiveness and
efficiency, but easily could be.
Given these three defining characteristics of the Army’s
contribution to the joint team, Army leaders should do two
things during the 2001 QDR. The first is to design force and
concept development programs that augment these
defining characteristics—versatility, full spectrum
decisiveness, and broad-spectrum support. The second is to
assure that these defining characteristics become central
components of American military strategy. While
versatility has moved in this direction as the array of tasks
given the U.S. military expanded, greater effort is needed to
amplify the role of full-spectrum decisiveness and
broad-spectrum support. As American military strategy is
adjusted via the 2001 QDR and the beginning of a new
presidential administration, the Army should integrate
these three defining characteristics into the transformation
process.
But what of the QDR? The 1997 QDR recommended only
modest changes in the concepts on which U.S. military
strategy is based. This was appropriate: the contours of the
new security environment were unclear at that point. The
U.S. military was in the midst of adjustment and
downsizing. The risk of MTW instigated by rogue states was
high enough that it had to be the centerpiece of American
strategic thinking. In the broadest sense, American
strategy was not “broken” and thus did not need “fixed.” But
these conditions are less applicable to the 2001 QDR. The
contours of the 21 st century security environment, which
were unclear in 1997, are moving into view. There is not
only the opportunity for more substantial strategic change,
but also a growing need for it. Given this, the soundest
military strategy for the United States in coming years is
one that blends components of all five of the strategic
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alternatives that have been discussed here. It should
integrate the following characteristics:

•

Increased emphasis on joint, combined, and
inter-agency experimentation, research, and
development, but avoidance of lock-in to one
particular type of future force. Phrased differently,
the U.S. military should prepare for transformation
but not yet commit to a particular technological
trajectory;

•

Development of an architecture to create interagency
strategic concepts and operational procedures in
addition to purely joint ones;

•

Abandonment of the two MTW force shaping
yardstick;

•

Greater emphasis on asymmetric and nontraditional
challenges (to include cancellation of procurement
applicable only or primarily to MTWs);

•

Movement toward a national security strategy that
stresses collaboration and partnership rather than
dominance and unilateralism. Development of
concepts and organizations designed specifically to
support regional partners and allies during
peacetime, crisis, and war (including a national
security strategy that concentrates on aiding with the
formation and development of regional structures);

•

A broadened approach to the issue of decisiveness to
include a strategic meaning as well as an operational
one;

•

A strategic focus on potential peer competitors,
specifically Russia and China. Modest engagement
with these nations while retaining the capability to
shift to containment if they prove unwilling to
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cooperate on the construction of global and regional
security systems.
*****
“Complexity” and “uncertainty” are the words most often
used to describe the current global security environment.
This is true. Because the global security system is in such
flux, the process of regular defense reviews and strategic
adjustments which the United States undertakes is
healthy. Institutionalization of it will keep Americans safe
for many decades. As the Department of Defense and the
Services learn how to undertake effective reviews and
adjustments, they will get even better at it. It is a learning
process. Given this, QDR 1997—the inaugural
effort—brought little change. QDR 2001 is likely to see
moderate adjustments. QDR 2005 and beyond will push
even further. The wild card is the outcome of the 2000
presidential election. As president, George Bush would
probably adopt something close to the Transformation
Approach to U.S. military strategy. 160 Since the official web
site of the Gore-Lieberman campaign states, “Al Gore has
developed a plan for American leadership on the world stage
a policy of Forward Engagement to address new security
issues before they become crises and to seize the
opportunities of a Global Age,” as president Gore would
probably favor a Shaping Approach. 161 In any case, though,
the years 2000 and 2001 will set the stage for all the reviews
and adjustments that come later.
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APPENDIX
CHRONOLOGY OF KEY STRATEGIC DOCUMENTS
AND REPORTS
1991
•Base Force Review
•National Security Strategy (August)
1992
•National Military Strategy (January)
1993
•Bottom Up Review Report (September)
1994
•National Security Strategy (July)
1995
•National Security Strategy (February)
•Commission on Roles and Missions (May)
•National Military Strategy
•Joint Vision 2010
1996
•National Security Strategy (February)
1997
•National Security Strategy (May)
•Quadrennial Defense Review (May)
•Concept for Future Joint Operations (May)
•Defense Reform Initiative Report (November)
•National Defense Panel Report (December)
Note: This chronology deals only with unclassified
documents. Documents in italics are planned or tentative.
The Secretary of Defense’s Report to the President and
Congress is also an important bellwether of American
strategy but because it is always produced annually, it is not
listed on this chronology .
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1998
•National Security Strategy (October)
1999
•Defense Science Board Report on Warfighting
Transformation (August)
•U.S. Commission on National Security/21st
Century,Phase I Report (September)
• National Security Strategy (December)
2000
•U.S. Commission on National Security/21st
Century, Phase II Report (April) • Joint Vision
2020 (May)
• National Security Strategy
2001
• U.S. Commission on National Security/21st
Century, Phase III Report (February)
• Quadrennial Defense Review
• National Military Strategy
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